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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2007, while adjudicating a dispute between Wachovia
Bank and Michigan’s Commissioner of Insurance and Financial Services, the United States Supreme Court effectively reversed two presumptions about federal preemption of state law that historically
have guided the delicate balance between state and federal authority
over consumer protection in banking services.1 The first presumption
is that issues involving consumer protection are “quintessentially”
matters of state (rather than federal) prerogative and are thus governed by state law unless specifically preempted by Congress.2 The
second presumption is that national banks are subject to “nondiscriminatory laws of general application” of the states where they are
∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis,
MN. B.A. Yale University; J.D. Columbia University School of Law. This Article is based
on presentations given at the Financial Institutions and Consumer Financial Services Section Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Annual Meeting, in Washington, D.C.,
in January 2006 and at a Conference on Federal Preemption in the Financial Institutions
Arena, Texas Tech University School of Law, Lubbock, Texas in April 2006. I am grateful
to the comments and insights from participants at both events, particularly Keith Fischer,
Howell Jackson, Kathleen Keest, Patricia M. McCoy, Christopher Peterson, Elizabeth Renuart, Heidi Mandanis Schooner, and Arthur E. Wilmarth. I am indebted to Tom Berg and
Michael Paulsen for their generous insights on federalism issues. I also thank Erika Toftness for her excellent research assistance.
1. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2007).
2. Id. at 1581.
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located, provided that those laws “do not ‘forbid’ or ‘impair significantly’ national bank activities.”3 In Watters v. Wachovia, the first
presumption was entirely negated, and the second presumption was
essentially reversed. After Watters, consumer protection in banking
services can no longer be considered to be primarily the province of
state legislatures. Furthermore, national banks can be presumed not
to be subject to any state law that hinders the efficient exercise of
any of the banks’ powers.
This development is a dramatic turning point in a persistent
struggle between the federal and state authorities for control over
consumer protection regulation in the banking industry. This struggle is a particularly complicated one because it plays out on two very
different planes. On one level, the struggle is over who should determine the degree and content of legal protection afforded to individual
consumers. Should the federal government establish a uniform level
of consumer protection with regard to banking services? Or should
individual states be permitted to establish nonuniform, state-specific
levels of consumer protection for their own citizens? On another level, the struggle is over who should determine the degree and content
of legal regulation applicable to the various kinds of banks operating
within a particular state. A unique characteristic of the American
banking industry is what is commonly referred to as the “dual banking system”—two parallel systems of banks operating side by side.4
One system is the state banking system, comprised of banks chartered and primarily regulated by state banking authorities.5 The other is the national banking system, comprised of banks chartered and
primarily regulated by federal banking authorities.6 Over the years,
state banks have become subject to increasing amounts of federal
regulation, while national banks have become increasingly immune
from state regulation. The reversal of presumptions about the applicability of state consumer credit laws has played a significant role in
this growing imbalance.
With the recent public spotlight on abusive lending practices and
their effect on consumers in both the home mortgage7 and credit card
3. Id. at 1574.
4. See generally Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977) (classic article discussing the evolution and
theoretical justifications for dual banking system).
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id.
7. Edmund L. Andrews, In Reversal, Fed Acts to Tighten Mortgage Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2007, at A1 (describing regulatory activity in the wake of the collapse of
the subprime lending market in fall 2007); Stacy Kaper, Benign? Many Say Schumer Bill
Would Bring Drastic Changes, AM. BANKER, May 8, 2007, at 1 (discussing legislation proposed by three Senate Banking Committee members to increase regulation of subprime
mortgage lending); Stacy Kaper, Schumer Fix in Subprime: Refi Fund, Tighter Regs, AM.
BANKER, May 4, 2007, at 1 (same); Stacy Kaper, Trepidation All Around as Anti-Predator
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lending areas,8 the possibility of federal legislation addressing consumer credit issues is more realistic now than it has been for decades.9 After the Watters ruling, it is clear that the courts will not provide any adjustments or corrections to the current balance of power
in this area. The current congressional focus on consumer credit issues thus presents a particularly timely opportunity for a principled
consideration of the appropriate balance of state and federal power
with respect to consumer banking services, taking into account the
policy considerations relevant to both planes of activity—the protection of consumers of banking services and the continued vitality of
the dual banking system. This Article will provide a framework for
such a principled consideration, proposing a new paradigm for regulation of consumer banking services that uses the mechanism of preemption to protect consumers while respecting and preserving the vitality of the dual banking system.
A careful analysis of the evolution of the arguments for federal
preemption of state banking laws supports this new perspective on
preemption. This analysis reveals a need to rethink the relationships
among three distinct developments in the market for consumer banking services over the past few decades. During this time, the enactment of significant federal consumer credit legislation and the increasingly aggressive preemption of state consumer regulation
Push Rolls On, AM. BANKER, Mar. 21, 2007, at 1 (discussing a growing sense in Congress
that legislation is necessary to address the subprime market crisis).
8. Joe Adler, Card Rules Have Fed, Lawmakers Far Apart: Where Central Bank
Would Boost Disclosure, Bills Seek Bans, AM. BANKER, May 29, 2007, at 1 (summarizing
seven bills pending in Congress to regulate credit card loans); Stacy Kaper, Support for
Credit Card Rulemaking Beyond Fed, AM. BANKER, June 8, 2007, at 1 (describing House
Financial Services Financial Institutions Subcommittee hearing on June 7, 2007 in which
the possibility of substantive federal credit card regulation was considered).
9. Indeed, in a recent letter to the heads of the federal banking regulatory agencies,
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank and House Energy and
Commerce Committee Chairman John Dingell cited, among other things, the Watters decision as one of the recent “developments bring[ing] into sharp relief an urgent need to rethink the way in which our financial regulators approach consumer protection.” Joe Adler,
In Brief: FTC to Gain More Authority?, AM. BANKER, May 14, 2007, at 19; see also Stacy
Kaper, A Vote Without a Resolution: Provisions in Mortgage Bill Remain in the Air, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 7, 2007, at 1 (summarizing legislative proposals being considered in wake of
the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the fall of 2007). Proposals introduced in
the 110th Congress include: Credit Card Reform Act of 2008, S. 2753, 110th Cong. (2008);
Credit Card Minimum Payment Notification Act of 2008, S. 2542, 110th Cong. (2008); Stop
Unfair Practices in Credit Cards Act of 2007, S. 1395, 110th Cong. (2007); Borrower’s Protection Act of 2007, S. 1299, 110th Cong. (2007); Stopping Mortgage Transactions Which
Operate to Promote Fraud, Risk, Abuse, and Underdevelopment Act, S. 1222, 110th Cong.
(2007); Fair and Justifiable Credit Card Interest Rate Act of 2008, H.R. 5988, 110th Cong.
(2008); Credit Cardholders’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, H.R. 5244, 110th Cong. (2008);
Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R. 3915, 110th Cong. (2007);
Universal Default Prohibition Act of 2007, H.R. 2146, 110th Cong. (2007); Credit Card
Minimum Payment Warning Act of 2007, S. 1176, 110th Cong. (2007); Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2007, H.R. 1461, 110th Cong. (2007); Consumer Overdraft Protection Fair Practices Act, H.R. 946, 110th Cong. (2007).
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through the operation of federal banking laws have increasingly federalized consumer protection laws related to banking services. Over
this same time period, the content of most consumer credit regulation has shifted from substantive restrictions on particular credit
terms to disclosure requirements. Also during the same time period,
the consumer credit market has become an increasingly national rather than regional market. Although these three developments—
federalization of consumer lending laws, substantive deregulation of
consumer credit, and nationalization of the consumer lending market—certainly have had causal relationships with each other over
the past decades, they are not necessarily linked. The critics of the
expansion of federal preemption have not fully appreciated the varying effects of these three developments on the two concerns at issue—consumer protection and the dual banking system. A clearer
understanding of the relationship among them, I argue, could open
the door to innovative and effective approaches to consumer credit
regulation within the framework of a strong dual banking system.
In Part II of this Article, I describe the historical evolution of consumer protection in the banking industry from primarily a matter of
state law to primarily a matter of federal law. This evolution occurred in three stages. The first stage was a gradual expansion of the
preemptive effect of a federal usury statute for national banks
through a combination of actions by federal banking regulatory agencies and case law. The second stage was the development of a broad
theoretical framework for federal preemption of state banking law
based not on a particular federal statute, but rather on a theory of
congressional intent to permit national banks to provide consistent
banking services nationwide, without any interference from inconsistent state regulations. The third stage was the validation of that
broad theory of federal preemption by the Supreme Court in Watters.
After illustrating this historical evolution, I demonstrate how the reversal of the historic presumptions has recently played itself out in
the context of the struggle between state and federal regulation of
bank-issued gift cards, culminating in the first citation of Watters by
a court.10
In Part III of this Article, I analyze the effects of the federalization of consumer protection law in the banking industry. I challenge
the proposition reflected in recent scholarship in this area suggesting
that federalization of consumer protection law always and necessarily entails deregulation of consumer protection law by unbundling
the three trends in consumer credit regulation noted above—
federalization of consumer lending laws, substantive deregulation of
10. See SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 532 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 1258 (2008).
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consumer credit, and nationalization of the consumer lending market. Nevertheless, I argue that Watters’ reversal of the presumption
of preemption of state consumer protection laws will have significant
adverse effects on the vitality of the dual banking system. I analyze a
recent shift in the tenor of arguments for the preservation of the dual
banking system. When bank powers were at stake, the argument
most often asserted was one based on the effectiveness of competition
to produce the best banking system; now that consumer protection
laws are at stake, a different argument, based on the principle of
subsidiarity, is increasingly being articulated. I argue that, while
both of these arguments are valid, the subsidiarity-based argument
asserted in the consumer protection context is likely to be more persuasive in convincing Congress to intervene to address the current
imbalance between national and state banks that endangers the vitality of the dual banking system.
Finally, in Part IV, I suggest a practical way to preserve such a
balance, inspired by a recent proposal before the primary federal
regulator of state-chartered banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), to assert on behalf of state-charted banks some
of the same wide-ranging preemption powers currently being asserted by the primary regulator of nationally-chartered banks, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), on behalf of nationally-chartered banks.11 Assertion of such powers on behalf of state
banks is arguably necessary to maintain a healthy and vital dual
banking system in the United States. However, it is not legally justifiable under current laws. Redress of this imbalance would require
action by Congress, including a partial reversal of Watters. Congress
might choose to harness the prodigious power of preemption by giving it some regulatory content at the federal level; or, it might
achieve the same effect, and at the same time preserve the vitality of
the dual banking system, by preserving a role for states in providing
regulatory content to preemption by state banks.
II. THE REVERSAL OF HISTORICAL PREEMPTION PRESUMPTIONS FOR
NATIONAL BANKS
A. The First Stage: Preemption by Expansion of the Exportation
Doctrine.12
The gradual reversal of presumptions about federal versus state
regulation of consumer banking issues tracks the development of in11. See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text.
12. The following section summarizes and updates the more detailed account of the
evolution of the OCC’s preemption position with respect to the Exportation Doctrine set
forth in Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine
and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004).
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terstate banking in the United States. As long as banks limited their
operations to the physical borders of the states in which they were
headquartered, other states’ laws were not important to them. However, as nationwide interstate banking developed, the inconsistency
of various state regulatory schemes became more of an operational
obstacle to national banks, leading to an almost total preemption of
state laws for national banks.
The first stage in this process involved increasingly expansive interpretations by the courts and the OCC of one federal statute—
section 85 of the National Bank Act.13 Section 85 gives a national
bank the power to charge
interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State [or] Territory .
. . where the bank is located . . . and no more, except that where
by the laws of any State a different rate is limited for banks organized under State laws, the rate so limited shall be allowed for [national banks] organized or existing in any such State.14

The “Most Favored Lender Doctrine,” first articulated by the Supreme Court in Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri,15 interpreted
Section 85 to permit national banks to take advantage of the most
favorable interest rates provided to any type of lender under the laws
of the state where the bank was located.16 This doctrine was developed in a series of cases in which national banks successfully argued
that they should be able to charge particularly favorable rates available to various types of lenders under state laws.17
However, as banks began to expand their operations across state
lines, the power to disregard various state laws became a more significant advantage. The most significant such power for national
banks was the power given to them under the “Exportation Doctrine”
to export the interest rate permitted by the state in which they are
located to other states. The Exportation Doctrine was articulated by
the Supreme Court in Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha
Service Corp.18 In that case, a national bank located in Minnesota
challenged the power of a national bank located in Nebraska to offer
credit card loans to residents of Minnesota at interest rates permitted under Nebraska law, but usurious under Minnesota law.19 The
13. National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 30, 13 Stat. 99, 108 (1864) (codified as amended at
12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000)). Section 85 has been amended a number of times, as described in detail in William G. Bornstein, Comment, Extension of the Most Favored Lender Doctrine
Under Federal Usury Law: A Contrary View, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1080-82 (1981-1982).
14. Id.
15. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409 (1873).
16. Id. at 413.
17. See Schiltz, supra note 12, at 545 n.122 (listing cases in which the Most Favored
Lender Doctrine was developed).
18. 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
19. Id. at 301-02.
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Court interpreted Section 85 to permit the Nebraska bank to “export”
the higher rates into Minnesota; Minnesota’s usury law was preempted by the federal law that allowed the Nebraska bank to charge
rates legal in Nebraska.20
A significant factor in the Court’s analysis was the fact that the
Nebraska bank itself had no physical presence in Minnesota.21 Nebraska, the state of the bank’s charter address and the only state in
which it had any offices or branches, was the only state in which the
bank could be considered to be “located” for purposes of Section 85.
The Nebraska bank was reaching borrowers in Minnesota by mail or
through agents, rather than by branch activity.22 Indeed, at the time
of the Marquette decision banks did not have the power to maintain
branches in states other than the states in which they were headquartered. Not until the enactment of the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal”)23 sixteen years later did Congress give national banks the power to
branch across state lines.
In those interim sixteen years, though, banks increasingly engaged in interstate banking by establishing physical presences that
stopped short of meeting the statutory definition of branches.24 During this period, the OCC promulgated a series of interpretations supporting the national banks’ position that their growing physical presence in the various states into which they were “exporting” interest
rates did not mean the banks were “located” in those states.25 The
banks continued to be “located,” for purposes of Section 85, in the
state listed as their charter headquarters. During this same time period, large credit card issuers began to realize the advantage of establishing “locations” for their credit card operations in banks chartered in states with generous usury laws (such as South Dakota, Delaware, and Utah),26 allowing them to preempt the usury laws of all
the other states in which they might solicit customers.
Riegle-Neal did not directly address how the presence of a legitimate branch in a state into which a bank wanted to export another
state’s interest rate might affect the Marquette analysis. Instead,
20. Id. at 313.
21. Schiltz, supra note 12, at 546-47. Marquette Bank named as defendants in the litigation Omaha Service Corp., a subsidiary of the Nebraska Bank organized under the laws
of Nebraska and qualified to do business in Minnesota, and the Credit Bureau of St. Paul,
a corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota not related to the Omaha Bank.
These two corporations apparently solicited the merchants and cardholders, respectively,
for Omaha Bank’s credit card program in Minnesota. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 304-05.
22. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 311.
23. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)).
24. Schiltz, supra note 12, at 549-53.
25. Id. at 549-52.
26. Id. at 552-53.
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Riegle-Neal states only that “[n]o provision of this title . . . shall be
construed as affecting the applicability of [Section 85].”27 The OCC
promptly promulgated an Interpretative Letter, IL 822, in which it
asserted that a bank’s power under Marquette to export its headquarter state’s interest rate laws “is not defeated simply because a
bank has a branch in the state where the borrower resides.”28 Furthermore, the OCC asserted that Riegle-Neal gave national banks
the power to export the interest rate either of the state where the
bank is headquartered or of the state where the bank has a branch,
depending on how much of the lending activity is conducted in
each location.29
IL 822 thus represented a dramatic expansion of preemption power by the OCC. It went significantly further than the Supreme Court
in Marquette by permitting a national bank to choose its “location”
for purposes of Section 85 from among any of the states in which it
has either a bank charter or a branch. Under Marquette, a national
bank could preempt the laws of forty-nine states, but only through
the application of the laws of one state—the state of its headquarters. Under IL 822, a national bank could theoretically establish
branches in fifty different states and take advantage of particular
advantageous laws for particular types of loans in each state to preempt the laws of forty-nine other states.
A 2006 Supreme Court decision concerning a national bank’s “location” for purposes of determining citizenship for federal court diversity jurisdiction purposes contains dicta supporting the OCC’s position. In Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt,30 the Court held that, for
purposes of establishing federal court jurisdiction based on diversity
of citizenship, a national bank was “located” in (and thus a citizen of)
only the state designated in its charter as its headquarters location,

27. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, § 111, Pub.
L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000)).
28. OCC Interpretative Letter No. 822, [1997-1998 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,265 (Feb. 17, 1998) [hereinafter IL 822].
29. Under IL 822, the location from which the loan is “made” determines which state’s
laws can be exported. To determine where a loan is “made,” the OCC divided the lending
process into two categories—ministerial functions and nonministerial functions. Ministerial functions—the strictly mechanical loan processing tasks such as providing applications
or processing payments—were deemed to be irrelevant to the “making” of a loan. Three
nonministerial functions—the decision to extend credit, the extension of credit itself, and
the disbursal of the proceeds of a loan—were considered integral to the “making” of the
loan. If all three of the nonministerial functions take place in the state where a bank has a
branch, the loan is definitely “made” in that state. However, if fewer than all three of those
functions are made in a state where a bank has a branch, the loan may be considered to
have been “made” in the state where the bank is headquartered, rather than the branch
state. IL 822, supra note 28, ¶ 90,261.
30. 546 U.S. 303 (2006).
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rather than in every state where it had a branch.31 The Court first
determined that “the term ‘located’ . . . has no fixed, plain meaning”
under the National Bank Act.32 Indeed, the Court characterized the
term as “a chameleon word; its meaning depends on the context in
and purpose for which it is used.”33 Focusing on the particular context and purpose for which this statute was being used, the Court
reasoned that national banks should be treated analogously to corporate citizens conducting business in more than one state; they are not
deemed to be citizens of every state in which they operate, but rather
of their state of incorporation or principal place of business.34 For a
national bank, the determinative “location” was held to be the state
of its charter address.35
In determining that the term “located” is capable of having more
than one meaning under the National Bank Act, the Court carefully
examined the various provisions of the National Bank Act in which
the term “located” is used and the meanings attached to it. The Court
noted that in some provisions the term “unquestionably refers to a
single place: the site of the banking association’s designated main office.”36 In other provisions, the Court noted that term “apparently refers to or includes branch offices.”37 Among the provisions singled out
as supportive of the latter interpretation, the Court included Section
85, specifically noting the construction given to it by the OCC in
IL 822.38
Although it might be tempting to dismiss this as mere dicta, Supreme Court dicta is not easily dismissed. Lower federal courts generally accord substantial weight to Supreme Court dicta if it is “carefully considered.”39 Since the OCC interpretation in IL 822 was specifically considered by the Supreme Court and identified as supporting the particular interpretations of banking law cited by the Court
in its opinion, it was arguably “carefully considered.” At the very
least, it will be accorded weight beyond that generally accorded to
31. Id. at 313. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000) provides that, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, national banks are “deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.”
32. Schmidt, 546 U.S. at 313.
33. Id. at 318.
34. Id. at 317.
35. Id. at 313.
36. Id. at 313 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 52, 55, 75, 182 (2000)).
37. Id.at 313-14 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(j), 85, 92 (2000)).
38. Id.
39. In Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004), the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a party’s dismissal of its opponent’s arguments based
solely on its characterization as “dicta.” The court explained, “[A]s we and our sister circuits have frequently noted, with ‘inferior [c]ourt[s]’ . . . ‘that argument carries no weight
since carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Sierra Club
v. E.P.A., 322 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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dicta by other federal courts. The OCC’s broad interpretation of “located” for purposes of Section 85 preemption is thus likely to be upheld.
During the same time period that the Exportation Doctrine expanded in the geographic sense through the definition of “located,” it
also expanded along another dimension—the scope of the credit
terms considered to be exportable as “interest” under Section 85.
This expansion succeeded through generous OCC interpretations
that were repeatedly challenged in courts across the country and repeatedly sanctioned by the courts, culminating in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A.40 The
Smiley Court held that the OCC has the regulatory authority to define “interest” for purposes of Section 85.41 Applying the standard of
deference to agency interpretations articulated in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,42 the Court upheld as
“reasonable”43 an OCC regulation that defined interest to include
“among other things, the following fees connected with credit extension or availability: numerical periodic rates, late fees, not sufficient
funds (NSF) fees, overlimit fees, annual fees, cash advance fees, and
membership fees.”44 Smiley’s endorsement of the OCC’s definition of
interest was another significant expansion of the preemption powers
of national banks. It gave national banks the power to preempt numerous potentially significant consumer protection laws that might
be on the books of states into which the bank was exporting interest rates.45
Thus, through aggressively expansive interpretations of two
words in one federal statute—“located” and “interest”—national
banks acquired substantial immunity from an increasing number of
state laws. At the time of its adoption, Section 85 subjected national
banks to, rather than excepted national banks from, the most significant substantive form of consumer credit regulation that existed—a
state’s limit on how much interest could be charged for loans to that
state’s citizens. One hundred and fifty years later, Section 85 has become a national bank’s most potent legal tool for ignoring not only
state usury limits, but also laws limiting other significant credit
terms such as annual fees, late fees, NSF fees, overlimit fees, cash
40. 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
41. Id. at 747.
42. 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984).
43. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 745.
44. Id. at 740 (quoting 61 Fed. Reg. 4869 (Feb. 9, 1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
7.4001(a) (2007))).
45. Indeed, the OCC has even argued that state disclosure laws could be covered by
the preemptive reach of § 85 because complying with such laws could affect the interest
rates charged. See Schiltz, supra note 12, 563-64 (discussing the use of this argument by
the OCC in American Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002)).
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advance fees, and even disclosure laws. This evolution took place
through a process of aggressive agency interpretations of the federal
law at issue, ratified by essentially unlimited judicial deference to
those interpretations.
However, in developing its arguments during this stage, the OCC
began to articulate a theory for national bank preemption of state
laws that was even more robust than the theory underlying its expansion of Section 85. The OCC’s expansion of the Exportation Doctrine was based primarily on its authority to interpret arguably ambiguous language in a specific federal law—Section 85—that has a
preemptive effect. The Supreme Court in Smiley applied Chevron deference to the OCC’s definition of interest only after concluding that
“interest” was an ambiguous term in the National Bank Act (a federal statute that the OCC was specifically charged with administering) and that the OCC’s interpretation was reasonable.46 The more
expansive, and exponentially more controversial, recent assertions of
preemption power by the OCC were based on a different theory of
preemption—a more general theory of “conflict preemption”—
pursuant to which the OCC has asserted the authority to exempt national banks from the reach of virtually all regulation by states.
B. The Second Stage: Setting the Groundwork for Comprehensive
Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws
In January 2004, the OCC promulgated a set of regulations that it
claimed clarified issues that had arisen regarding the applicability of
state law to national banks (the “Preemption Regulations”). In these
regulations, the OCC applied the same template of a preemption
claim to four separate categories of powers given by statute to national banks: the power to take deposits,47 the power to make loans
secured by real estate,48 the power to make loans not secured by real
estate,49 and the catch-all power to exercise all powers authorized
under federal law as part of the “business of banking.”50 In each case,
the regulation declared, “[e]xcept where made applicable by Federal
law, state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s
exercise of [powers authorized by Federal law] are not applicable to
national banks.”51 The Preemption Regulations identified particular
state laws applicable to the particular powers that are explicitly pre-

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
ently).

Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739-45.
12 C.F.R. § 7.4007 (2007).
Id. § 34.4.
Id. § 7.4008.
Id. § 7.4009.
Id. §§ 7.4007(b)(1), 7.4008(c)(1), 7.4009(b); cf. § 34.4(a) (worded slightly differ-
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empted, such as disclosure requirements,52 the ability of the bank to
require insurance for collateral,53 and credit terms.54 The Preemption
Regulations also offered a list of state laws that were presumed not
to be inconsistent with the powers of national banks and thus applicable to national banks, but only “to the extent that they only incidentally affect the exercise of national bank powers.”55 These included laws governing contracts, torts, criminal law, homestead laws
for real estate loans, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer
of property, taxation, zoning, and “[a]ny other law the effect of which
the OCC determines to be incidental to . . . or otherwise consistent
with” the powers of national banks.56
When the OCC first published the Preemption Regulations for
public comment, it noted some confusion with respect to the basis of
its authority to preempt state law. The Supreme Court has identified
three general ways in which the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution57 can operate to preempt state laws. The first is express preemption, which occurs when Congress expressly preempts state law in a
federal statute.58 The second is “field preemption,” which occurs when
Congress adopts a comprehensive framework of regulations that pervasively occupies that entire field, leaving no opening for state regulation.59 The third is “conflict preemption,” which occurs when federal
law and state law conflict; conflict can be found either if it is physically impossible to comply with both laws60 or if the state “law stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”61 In proposing the Preemption
Regulation, the OCC noted that “Our positions in some instances . . .
have not clearly reflected whether we were employing an ‘occupation
of the field’ or ‘conflicts’ approach, although our individual preemption decisions have more commonly reflected a ‘conflict’ type approach to preemption analysis.”62 The OCC suggested that the comprehensive federal system of laws governing the operations of na-

52. Id. §§ 7.4007(b)(2)(iii), 7.4008(d)(2)(viii), 34.4(a)(9).
53. Id. §§ 7.4008(d)(2)(ii), 34.4(a)(2).
54. Id. §§ 7.4008(d)(2)(iv), 34.4(a)(4).
55. Id. §§ 7.4007(c), 7.4008(e), 7.4009(c)(2), 34.4(b).
56. Id.
57. “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
58. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
59. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
60. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
61. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
62. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed.
Reg. 46,119, 46,123 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34) [hereinafter Preemption Proposal].
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tional banks is similar to that governing federal savings associations
and that the OCC might be justified in asserting the same type of
“field preemption” accorded to federal thrifts.63 Indeed, it specifically
invited public comment on whether it should assert field preemption.
The invitation to comment on whether field preemption was appropriate was issued most particularly for the portion of the proposed
regulation dealing with real estate lending by banks.64 Indeed, most
of the recent state legislative activity to combat predatory lending
has focused on real estate secured lending, and thus most of the conflict has been between the states trying to enforce and the national
banks trying to avoid such legislation.65 The OCC proposed a particularly detailed set of arguments for its preemption authority with respect to real estate lending by national banks based on the language
of 12 U.S.C. § 371, the federal statute that authorizes banks to make
real estate loans.66 By its terms, Section 371 authorizes national
banks to make real estate loans “subject to . . . such restrictions and
requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may prescribe by
regulation or order”67 and subject to another federal law requiring
the federal banking agencies to adopt uniform regulations prescribing standards for real estate lending by financial institutions.68 The
OCC suggested that “this authority arguably enables the OCC to occupy the field of regulation of national banks’ real estate lending.”69
However, when it issued the final Preemption Regulations, the
OCC declined to assert field preemption, either for real estate lending or for any other portions of its regulation.70 Instead, the OCC argued that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Barnett Bank, N.A. v. Nelson,71
had adopted conflict preemption as the appropriate standard for pre-

63. Id. at 46,129 n.91; see also Schiltz, supra note 12, at 604-17 (contrasting authority
for field preemption asserted by the OTS with respect to federal savings associations with
authority for field preemption asserted by the OCC with respect to national banks).
64. This invitation was specifically issued with respect to the real estate lending portion of the Preemption Regulation, Preemption Proposal, supra note 62, at 46,124, and was
suggested with respect to the more general portions of the Preemption Regulation. Id. at
46,129 n.91.
65. See, e.g., Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003)
(preempting Georgia Fair Lending Act, which restricted the ability of lenders to charge
certain fees on various categories of home loans).
66. Id.
67. 12 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o), amended by Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Conforming
Amendments Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-173, § 8(a)(29), 119 Stat. 3601, 3615 (2006).
69. Preemption Proposal, supra note 62, at 46,125.
70. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. 1904, 1910-11 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 & 34) [hereinafter Final Preemption Rule].
71. 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
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emption questions involving national banking laws.72 Quoting Barnett, the OCC explained that:
In defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regulations
granting a power to national banks, these cases take the view that
normally Congress would not want States to forbid, or impair significantly, the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted.
To say this is not to deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where (unlike here) doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s exercise of its powers.73

The OCC argued that there was no single, settled formulation of this
conflict standard in this particular context. It argued that its regulation, which preempted all state laws that “obstruct, impair, or condition” a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its federally granted
powers, was a justifiable articulation of this conflict standard for national banks—a “distillation of the various preemption constructs articulated by the Supreme Court.”74 The formulation was aimed at
conveying the following substantive point: “that state laws do not apply to national banks if they impermissibly contain a bank’s exercise
of a federally authorized power.”75
The OCC’s preemption argument is that Congress adopted a set of
laws with the purpose of establishing a national banking system that
would operate “distinctly and separately from the existing system of
state banks,”76 with long-range goals “including financing commerce,
establishing private depositories, and generally supporting economic
growth and development nationwide.”77 To accomplish these goals,
the OCC argued, Congress specifically granted national banks the
flexible authority found in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) “to exercise ‘all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business
of banking.’ ”78 Congress also explicitly gave the OCC
the fundamental responsibility of ensuring that national banks operate on a safe and sound basis, and that they are able to do so, if
they choose, to the full extent of their powers under Federal law.
This responsibility includes enabling the national banking system
to operate as authorized by Congress, consistent with the essential
character of a national banking system and without undue con-

72. Final Preemption Rule, supra note 70, at 1910.
73. Id. (quoting Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33-34).
74. Id. The OCC cited specific Supreme Court opinions for each of the three terms
used. Id. at 1910 nn.51-53.
75. Id. at 1910.
76. Id. at 1907 n.17.
77. Id. at 1907.
78. Id.
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finement of their powers. Federal law gives the OCC broad rulemaking authority in order to fulfill these responsibilities.79

In essence, the OCC argued that Congress specifically gave national
banks flexible powers, with statutory language permitting the evolution of powers to facilitate the natural evolution of a national financial services market; additionally, Congress specifically gave the
OCC flexible authority to adopt whatever regulations might be necessary to ensure that national banks can exercise these flexible powers to the fullest extent possible.
The OCC noted that profound changes in the financial services
marketplace over the past years have created a truly nationwide
market for both consumer and commercial credit, for deposits, and
for other financial services. The OCC highlighted three developments: (1) technological innovations, such as the Internet, that have
expanded both the consumer’s market for financial services providers
and the banks’ market for customers nationwide; (2) the erosion of
legal barriers to interstate banking; and (3) the increasing mobility of
society, leading to an expectation of portable and consistent financial
relationships.80 The OCC explained that
These developments highlight the significance of being able to
conduct a banking business pursuant to consistent, national standards, regardless of the location of a customer when he or she first
becomes a bank customer or the location to which the customer
may move after becoming a bank customer. They also accentuate
the costs and interference that diverse and potentially conflicting
state and local laws have on the ability of national banks to operate under the powers of their Federal charter. For national banks,
moreover, the ability to operate under uniform standards of operation and supervision is fundamental to the character of their national charter. When national banks are unable to operate under
national standards, it also implicates the role and responsibilities
of the OCC.81

In short, the OCC argued that Congress has, over the years, created a nationwide system of banking for national banks. The OCC
has the authority to implement regulations to let them operate on a
nationwide basis. Inconsistent state banking laws applicable in discrete geographic pockets within a bank’s nationwide market interfere
with the ability of national banks to fully exercise their authority to

79. Id. (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 1907-08.
81. Id. at 1908 (second emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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operate nationwide.82 Thus, under the conflict preemption standards
articulated above, such laws “obstruct, impair, or condition” a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its federally granted powers uniformly throughout its national market and are thus preempted.
The OCC further asserted that its preemption arguments also apply to operating subsidiaries of national banks as well as to the national bank parent (even though the subsidiaries are state-chartered
corporations) pursuant to a pre-existing regulation which provides:
“Unless otherwise provided by Federal law or OCC regulation, State
laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws apply to the parent national bank.”83 The OCC
justified the extension of the Preemption Regulations to operating
subsidiaries of national banks on the grounds that operating subsidiaries are nothing more than incorporated departments of the national bank itself.84 For purposes of accounting, regulatory reporting,
and applying many federal statutory and regulatory limits, the subsidiaries are consolidated with the parent bank.85 Thus, any power
that the parent bank has to preempt state laws can be asserted by
the bank through any of its operating subsidiaries.86
As a companion to the Preemption Regulations, the OCC also
promulgated a regulation asserting that only the OCC has the power
to exercise visitorial powers with respect to national banks or their
subsidiaries and that state officials have no authority to exercise any
visitorial powers with respect to national banks or their subsidiaries
(including conducting examinations, inspecting their records, or
prosecuting enforcement actions), except where specifically authorized by federal law (the “Visitorial Regulation”).87 The Visitorial
Regulation was supported not directly with a preemption argument,
but rather on the grounds that “[t]he OCC’s exclusive visitorial authority complements principles of Federal preemption.”88 Indeed, the
82. The OCC explained:
When national banks are unable to operate under uniform, consistent,
and predictable standards, their business suffers, which negatively affects their safety and soundness. The application of multiple, often unpredictable, different state or local restrictions and requirements prevents them from operating in the manner authorized under Federal law,
is costly and burdensome, interferes with their ability to plan their business and manage their risks, and subjects them to uncertain liabilities
and potential exposure.
Id.

83. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2007).
84. Final Preemption Rule, supra note 70, at 1905.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 (2007).
88. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 6363, 6368 (Feb. 7, 2003) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 28 & 34).
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OCC argued that the Visitorial Regulation “would not have the effect
of preempting substantive state laws, but rather would clarify the
appropriate agency for enforcing those state laws that are applicable
to national banks.”89 The OCC’s position was that its rule is an interpretation of the federal law providing that “[n]o national bank shall
be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law.”90
With the Preemption and Visitorial Regulations, the OCC exponentially broadened the scope of a national bank’s immunity from
state consumer protection laws in a number of significant ways.
First, the OCC uncoupled the preemption argument from particularized statutory grants of power. The authority for preemption of state
law by federal law is not based on judicial deference to an agency’s
interpretation of a particular statute, such as Section 85 or Section
371. Instead, the authority for preemption of state law is based on
the entirety of national banking laws, which evidence congressional
intent to establish a national banking system within which national
banks are granted a flexible set of incidental powers that evolve with
the development of the banking industry. As a consequence of this
uncoupling, the OCC could assert preemption for all banking powers,
not merely for the lending activities governed by Section 85 or Section 371. Second, the OCC established the ability to operate uniformly throughout the nation, without interference by inconsistent
state laws, as a fundamental characteristic of the national bank
charter. Third, the OCC jettisoned the principle that consumer protection laws are quintessentially matters of state law. Despite the
fact that Congress in Riegle-Neal identified consumer protection as
one of four areas of particular interest to states,91 the only state laws
the OCC recognized as being presumptively applicable to national
banks are those governing contracts, torts, criminal law, homestead
89. Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1896 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7).
90. Id. at 1895 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 484 (2000)). The full text of this statute reads:
(a) No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except
as authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such as
shall be, or have been exercised or directed by Congress or by either
House thereof or by any committee of Congress or of either House duly
authorized.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, lawfully authorized State auditors and examiners may, at reasonable times and upon
reasonable notice to a bank, review its records solely to ensure compliance with applicable State unclaimed property or escheat laws upon reasonable cause to believe that the bank has failed to comply with such
laws.
12 U.S.C. 484 (2000).
91. 12 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2000). The other three areas identified in Riegle-Neal as being
of particular interest to states were community reinvestment, fair lending, and the establishment of intrastate branches.
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law, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer of property, taxation, and zoning—and even those are only applicable to the extent
they only incidentally affect the exercise of national bank powers.92
As the icing on the cake, the OCC asserted that this aggressively
expansive presumption position applies not only to nationallychartered banks, but also to state-chartered corporations whollyowned by these banks.93 And, finally, the OCC claimed that even the
state laws that do apply to national banks cannot be enforced by
state regulators; only federal regulators have visitorial authority
with respect to national banks or their subsidiaries.94
C. Watters v. Wachovia: Vindication of the OCC’s Conflict
Preemption Argument
In the years leading up to and following the promulgation of the
Preemption Regulations, commentators disagreeing with the OCC’s
aggressive preemption position have expressed increasing levels of
frustration over the “phenomenal success” enjoyed by the OCC in judicial challenges to its incrementally more expansive assertions of
immunity from state law for national banks.95 In Watters v. Wachovia
Bank, N.A., the Supreme Court handed the OCC its most phenomenal success to date, ratifying essentially all of the OCC’s broad conflict preemption argument as outlined in the preamble to the Preemption Regulations.96
Watters involved a challenge to the OCC’s assertion of federal preemption of a state law requiring the operating subsidiary of a national bank to comply with state mortgage licensing laws.97 The subsidiary at issue was Wachovia Mortgage Corporation (“Wachovia
92. Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
93. Supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
94. Supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
95. Keith R. Fisher, Towards a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to National Bank
Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 981, 996
(2006). Fisher identified four recent federal court decisions in which the OCC’s assertion of
preemption for national banks had been upheld: Wells Fargo Bank of Texas, N.A. v. James,
321 F.3d 488 (5th. Cir. 2003); Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th. Cir. 2002);
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Sorrell, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (N.D. Ga. 2002); and Am. Bankers Ass’n
v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002), and four recent federal court decisions in
which the OCC’s assertion of preemption power for national bank operating subsidiaries or
the exclusive visitorial position had been upheld: Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 334 F.
Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 319 F. Supp. 2d 275 (D.
Conn. 2004), aff’d on preemption issue, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied 127 S. Ct.
2093 (2007); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (E.D. Cal. 2003);
Nat’l City Bank v. Boutris, No. Civ. S-03-0655 GEB J, 2003 WL 21536818 (E.D. Cal. July
2, 2003). More recently, Office of Comptroller of Currency v. Spitzer has added another jurisdiction to the list of those upholding the OCC’s exclusive visitorial position. 396 F. Supp.
2d 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, Clearing House Ass’n v. Cuomo, 510 F. 3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007).
96. 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2006).
97. Id. at 1564-66.
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Mortgage”), a corporation organized under the laws of North Carolina and operating as a mortgage lender in Michigan.98 On January 1,
2003, the ownership of Wachovia Mortgage was transferred from
Wachovia Bank’s parent holding company, a North Carolina corporation,99 to Wachovia Bank, a nationally-chartered bank.100 A few
months later, Wachovia Mortgage informed the Michigan Office of
Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS) that, as an operating subsidiary of a national bank, it was no longer subject to the provisions
of Michigan law requiring non-bank operating subsidiaries of out-ofstate national banks to register with OFIS.101 OFIS objected to Wachovia Mortgage’s surrender of its license, and Wachovia Mortgage
and Wachovia Bank filed suit against the OFIS Commissioner,
Linda Watters.102
Both of the lower federal courts that heard this case upheld Wachovia’s position that federal banking law preempted Michigan’s registration requirements for operating subsidiaries of national banks.103
Indeed, all of the circuit courts opining on this issue had reached the
same conclusion.104 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two questions: (1) whether the OCC’s regulation interpreting the National Bank Act’s limitation on visitorial powers
over national banks to extend to operating subsidiaries of national
banks was entitled to Chevron deference; and (2) whether the OCC’s
equation of state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks
with national banks themselves (for purposes of federal preemption)
violated the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.105
This grant of certiorari was interpreted by many observers as a
sign that the Court might be willing to impose some limits on the
OCC’s aggressive preemption positions, particularly since there was
no split in the circuits that needed to be resolved.106 The facts of the
98. Id. at 1565.
99. WACHOVIA CORPORATION, RESTATED ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION (2002), available at http://www.wachovia.com/file/CorpGovArticlesofIncorporation2001.pdf.
100. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1565.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6th Cir. 2005); Wachovia Bank,
N.A. v. Watters, 334 F. Supp. 2d 957 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
104. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 2093 (2007); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005).
105. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct.
1559 (2007) (No. 05-1342); Order List Granting Certiorari, Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A., 126 S. Ct. 2900 (June 19, 2006) (No. 05-1342) (mem.).
106. See Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, U.S. Supreme Court to Review
State Regulation of National Bank Operating Subsidiaries, 21ST CENTURY MONEY,
BANKING & COMMERCE ALERT No. 06-06-21, June 21, 2006, at 2, available at
http://www.ffhsj.com/siteFiles/ffFiles/060621.pdf; Todd Davenport, Wachovia Preemption
Suit: Gauging the Implications, AM. BANKER, Dec. 4, 2006, at 4; Thomas P. Vartanian &
Dominic A. Labitzky, Viewpoint: Preparing Post-Watters ‘Op Sub’ Strategies, AM. BANKER,
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case present the underlying issues in starkly dramatic relief. The
state-chartered corporation at issue obtained a national bank’s immunity from state law simply because its ownership was transferred
from the corporate parent in a holding company structure to a national bank subsidiary. Is federal preemption of state law as a result
of such corporate restructuring justified in the absence of a specific
federal law, based on the OCC’s construction of a broad congressional
grant of authority for national banks to provide consistent nationwide banking services?
However, rather than circumscribing the preemption powers of
national banks, the Supreme Court decisively and dramatically validated the broad conflict preemption position underlying the OCC
Preemption Regulations. A vigorous dissent107 argued in vain for the
preservation of the historic presumption against preemption of state
law except where expressly preempted by Congress, reminding the
majority “that because federal law is generally interstitial, national
banks must comply with most of the same rules as their state counterparts,” except where the state’s “nondiscriminatory laws of general application” either “forbid” or “impair significantly” the national
bank’s exercise of its powers.108 The dissent found it “especially troubling that the Court so blithely preempts Michigan laws designed to
protect consumers. Consumer protection is quintessentially a ‘field
which the States have traditionally occupied.’ ”109 The dissent argued
that affirming those historic presumptions—and recognizing that
Congress did not, in fact, expressly authorize preemption of state law
with respect to operating subsidiaries of national banks—should
have led the Court to the conclusion that the OCC had overstepped
its authority in asserting preemption powers for operating subsidiaries.110 By definition, though, the dissent’s arguments were not the
ones that prevailed.

Mar. 2, 2007, at 11; Viewpoint: Electoral Tide, a Warning on Preemption, AM. BANKER, Dec.
15, 2006, at 11; Ben Winograd, Briefs Filed in High Court Preemption Challenge, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 7, 2006, at 1.
107. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1573-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion
was written by Justice Stevens and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia. For
some interesting observations about the general positions of the various Justices on preemption issues (including the characterization of Justice Stevens as “the standard-bearer
for voting against preemption”), see Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor
Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1366 n.42 (2006). However, Issacharoff and
Sharkey characterize Justice Scalia as representing the other extreme, finding more readily for preemption, suggesting that the dissent in Watters presented a somewhat uncharacteristic alliance on these issues. Id. at 1367 n.42.
108. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1574.
109. Id. at 1581 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
110. Id. at 1583-84.
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The majority opinion111 summarily rejected Watters’ arguments on
both of the questions on which certiorari had been granted. The
Court ruled that “the level of deference owed to the [OCC’s] regulation is an academic question” because the regulation merely clarifies
and confirms preemption powers expressly conferred by federal statute.112 The Court dismissed Watters’ Tenth Amendment argument in
four brief sentences, with the conclusion that “[r]egulation of national bank operations is a prerogative of Congress under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses” and is therefore not a
power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.113
The bulk of the Court’s opinion fleshed out what can only be characterized as the broadest possible construction of the OCC’s general
conflict preemption argument. Even before the creation of the current
national banking system with the promulgation of the National Bank
Act (NBA), the Court claimed that it “held federal law supreme over
state law with respect to national banking” in McCulloch v. Maryland.114 The enactment of the NBA in 1864 established “the system of
national banking still in place today,”115 a system that the Court took
pains to describe as one which Congress expressly intended to be
largely free of state interference. Indeed, the Court enshrined
“[s]ecurity against significant interference by state regulators [as] a
characteristic condition of the ‘business of banking’ conducted by national banks.”116 The Court characterized the national banking system that Congress intended to establish with the NBA as “a system
extending throughout the country, and independent, so far as powers
conferred are concerned, of state legislation which, if permitted to be
applicable, might impose limitations and restrictions as various and
as numerous as the States.”117 The Court’s primary statutory support
for this characterization was the section of the NBA reserving visitorial powers over national banks to the OCC.118
Although the Court emphasized that the real estate lending activities at issue in this particular case are a category of the business
of banking indisputably outside the jurisdiction of state regulation, it
111. The majority opinion was drafted by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices
Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Alito. Id. at 1563 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 1572.
113. Id. at 1573. The dissent also rejected the Tenth Amendment arguments. Id. at
1585 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a defense of these Tenth Amendment arguments, see
generally Fisher, supra note 95.
114. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1566 (majority opinion) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316 (1819)).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1571. This echoes the language in the OCC’s preamble to the Preemption
Regulations. See supra text accompanying note 81.
117. Id. at 1568 (citing Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229 (1903)).
118. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2000), which states that “[n]o national bank shall be
subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal law”).
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emphatically declined to limit the scope of its ruling to such activities: “Beyond genuine dispute, state law may not significantly burden
a national bank’s own exercise of its real estate lending power, just
as it may not curtail or hinder a national bank’s efficient exercise of
any other power, incidental or enumerated under the NBA.”119
Although the Court did not expressly cite the OCC’s Preemption
Regulation,120 it adopted the Preemption Regulation’s articulation of
the conflict preemption standard for national banks,121 ruling that
[s]tates are permitted to regulate the activities of national banks where doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s or the national
bank regulator’s exercise of its powers. But when state
prescriptions significantly impair the exercise of authority, enumerated or incidental under the NBA, the State’s
regulations must give way.122

The Court, like the OCC, cited its Barnett decision in support of
this proposition.123
After thus affirming the broadest possible construction of the
OCC’s general preemption theory for national banks, the Court then
decisively rejected Watters’ arguments that these broad preemption
powers should not be extended to operating subsidiaries of national
banks.124 The Court described how the OCC in 1966 recognized the
authority of national banks to conduct any business authorized by
the bank itself through operating subsidiaries.125 For supervisory
purposes, the OCC historically treated operating subsidiaries as a
part of the parent national bank, rather than as separate corporate
entities.126 The Court concluded that Congress ratified the authority
and regulatory treatment of operating subsidiaries with the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA).127 GLBA authorized national banks under certain conditions to affiliate with
nonbank corporate entities conducting certain financial activities not
directly authorized for national banks.128 GLBA distinguished these
newly authorized affiliations from the affiliations traditionally au119. Id. at 1567-68 (emphasis added).
120. The Court did, however, cite the OCC Preemption Regulations preamble in arguing that national banks should not be subject to multiple enforcement regimes of the various states in which they operate. Id. at 1568 n.6.
121. See sources cited supra note 51.
122. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1567.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1569.
125. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh)).
126. Id. at 1570 n.10.
127. Id. at 1570.
128. See generally PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL § 4.03[3] (2003) (describing generally activities and regulatory limitations of financial subsidiaries).
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thorized between banks and their operating subsidiaries engaged in
traditional banking activities by exempting from the new regulatory
scheme “a subsidiary that . . . engages solely in activities that national banks are permitted to engage in directly and are conducted
subject to the same terms and conditions that govern the conduct of
such activities by national banks.”129
After thus establishing a statutory foundation both for the authority to operate through operating subsidiaries and for the OCC’s regulatory treatment of such subsidiaries as indistinguishable from the
operations of the bank itself, the Court then stated:
We have never held that the preemptive reach of the NBA extends
only to a national bank itself. Rather, in analyzing whether state
law hampers the federally permitted activities of a national bank,
we have focused on the exercise of a national bank’s powers, not on
its corporate structure. And we have treated operating subsidiaries as equivalent to national banks with respect to powers exercised under federal law (except where federal law provides otherwise).130

The Court supported this claim with reference to two significant affirmations of the scope of national bank powers in which the entity
conducting the activity was an operating subsidiary rather than the
bank itself—the power to sell annuities131 and the power to offer discount brokerage services.132
The Court rejected Watters’ argument that Congress’ failure to
specifically include “operating subsidiaries” in the language of the
statute denying states visitorial powers over national banks133 meant
that Congress intended operating subsidiaries to be subject to such
power, for two reasons. First, operating subsidiaries were not authorized by the OCC until decades after that statutory provision was
written, and while operating subsidiaries have since “emerged as important instrumentalities of national banks,” Congress has not objected to the OCC’s treatment of them as functionally equivalent to
the banks.134 Second, the Court again emphasized that GLBA’s distinction between the operating subsidiary, which is limited in operations to activities permitted to its parent bank, and all other affiliates is a ratification of the OCC’s conception of the operating subsidiary as equivalent to the bank for regulatory purposes.135
129. 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A) (2000).
130. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1570-71 (internal citation omitted).
131. NationsBank of North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251 (1995).
132. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
133. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
134. Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1571.
135. Id.
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Watters thus not only affirmed the substance of the Preemption
Regulation, but it also unequivocally adopted the OCC’s theoretical
framework for the broadest possible preemption powers for national
banks. The Court located the statutory authority for federal preemption not in any particular Congressional grants of power, but rather
in the entirety of national banking laws. As a consequence, this preemption power could be asserted with respect to all national bank
powers, whether incidental or enumerated. The Court identified the
ability to operate uniformly across the nation without interference by
state banking regulators as a characteristic of the national bank
charter.136 Furthermore, the Court did not even deem the fact that
the state laws being preempted were consumer protection laws worthy of mention.
After Watters, it is no longer accurate to say that matters involving consumer protection in banking services are presumptively matters of state, rather than federal, authority. Furthermore, it is no
longer accurate to say that national banks are presumed to be subject to state law unless specifically preempted by Congress; instead,
national banks can be presumed to be exempt from any state law
that infringes in any way on banks’ ability to offer banking services
nationwide on uniform terms. These two historical presumptions underlying the dual banking system have been reversed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals, the first court to cite Watters, in the context of
state bank regulation of gift cards issued by national banks, made
evident the dramatic consequences of this reversal.
D. Case Study: Gift Card Guidance and Litigation
In August 2006, the OCC issued guidelines to national banks selling gift cards, stressing the importance of “sound disclosure practices
to help ensure that consumers understand the gift card products they
are purchasing and using.”137 Three days later, the American Banker,
the daily newspaper of the banking industry, published an analysis
of the reaction to these guidelines.138 The article reported that some
in the banking industry opposed the new guidelines.139 The American
Bankers Association claimed “that the guidelines were overly restrictive and would hurt national banks.”140 However, most other banking
industry groups, such as the Consumer Bankers Association, America’s Community Bankers, and the Independent Community Bankers
136. Id. at 1562.
137. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 2006-34, GIFT
CARD DISCLOSURES at 2 (2006) [hereinafter GIFT CARD GUIDELINES].
138. Stacey Kaper, Is Gift Card Guidance Preemption Precursor? AM. BANKER, Aug. 17,
2006, at 1.
139. Id.
140. Id.
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of America, “welcomed the guidance” as helpful clarification in an
area rendered confusing by litigation.141 Consumer advocates, on the
other hand, claimed that the guidelines were not strong enough, characterizing them as “ ‘extremely weak’ . . . allow[ing] banks to do anything as long as they disclose it.”142
More interesting than these fairly predictable alignments of arguments with respect to the content of the regulation, however, were
the reactions of analysts to the strategic impact of this guidance.
Most of the article focused on the effect this guidance would have on
state laws governing gift cards, particularly state laws imposing more
stringent restrictions on gift cards.143 The analysts, whether they approved or disapproved of the move, came to the consensus that the
OCC took this step to assure that all inconsistent state laws would be
preempted for national banks. One analyst explained:
It’s very much analogous to what the OCC has done in all of its
preemption decisions. . . . It defines a national standard that includes more consumer protection than the industry generally
would like, but it is often less than is possible under certain state
law and simultaneously creates a uniform framework . . . .144

Or, in the words of a consumer advocate, “[t]he states were regulating this product. Now the OCC is virtually unregulating it.”145
The Gift Card Guidelines146 and their effect on litigation challenging federal preemption of state laws governing gift cards provide a
paradigmatic example of the reversal of preemption presumptions in
consumer protection regulation in the banking industry. They consist
of federal regulation based on disclosure of terms rather than substantive regulation of terms. They involve a banking product other
than a loan, representing an expansion of the preemption power beyond the lending context that served as the initial staging ground for
preemption of state laws governing banking services. The preemptive
authority of the Gift Card Guidelines is based on the broad conflict
preemption argument laid out by the OCC in its Preemption Regulation. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte,147 the first judicial opinion to cite
Watters, confirmed this preemptive effect.

141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Edmund Mierzwinski, Director of Consumer Programs at the U.S.
Public Interest Research Group).
143. See infra note 155.
144. Kaper, supra note 138 (quoting Karen Shaw Petrou, Managing Partner of Federal
Financial Analytics Inc).
145. Id. (quoting Edmund Mierzwinski, Director of Consumer Programs at the U.S.
Public Interest Research Group).
146. GIFT CARD GUIDELINES, supra note 137.
147. 488 F.3d 525, 532 (1st Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1258 (2008).
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The Gift Card Guidelines apply to bank-issued prepaid or stored
value cards intended to be purchased by one consumer and given as a
gift to another consumer.148 In contrast to gift cards issued by retailers (which typically can be used only at those retailers and their affiliates), the bank-issued gift cards covered by these guidelines are
associated with a card network like Visa, MasterCard, or American
Express, and can be used at any merchant that accepts cards from
that network.149
The Gift Card Guidelines do not impose any substantive restrictions on the features of such cards. Instead, they set forth the types
of disclosures that the OCC expects national bank gift card issuers to
provide purchasers and users of such cards. Basic information considered to be essential to the card users’ decisions about how to use
the card should be put on the card itself, either directly or in the form
of a sticker.150 Such information should include: the card’s expiration
date; the amount or existence of any monthly maintenance, dormancy, or usage fee; and a toll-free phone number or website address
for inquiries about the card.151 The issuer should also provide additional information in a form designed to be passed on to the ultimate
user of the card, in promotional packaging, or in a sleeve containing
the card itself.152 The exact content of such additional disclosures will
depend on the particular card’s features.153 Finally, the Gift Card
Guidelines warn national banks to avoid using misleading marketing
or promotional practices in connection with the sale of gift cards.154
This de minimus federal regulation of gift cards—requiring disclosure instead of imposing restrictions on fees or terms—contrasts with
the more substantive regulation of the terms of gift cards enacted by
a growing list of states over the past decades.155 The states impose
148. GIFT CARD GUIDELINES, supra note 137, at 1.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. The OCC suggests that the following types of information might be provided: the
name of the bank issuing the card; other fees such as card replacement, balance inquiry, or
cash redemption; whether and how consumers can obtain replacement cards; consumer liability for unauthorized use; whether and how the card can be used at merchants such as
gas stations and restaurants that may seek payment authorization in amounts greater
than the amount of the purchase; when the issuer may refuse to authorize transactions on
the card; the importance of tracking the remaining balance on the card; whether and how
the card can be used in conjunction with other forms of payment; the process for redeeming
cash balances; how to resolve consumer problems; and, when applicable, the issuer’s ability
to revoke or change terms of the card. Id. at 2-3.
154. Id. at 3.
155. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7402 (2007) (gift cards must conspicuously
disclose expiration dates in a way that is clearly visible prior to purchase); CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1749.5 (West 2008) (no expiration dates or fees, unless the balance of the card is $5 or
less, in which case a maximum $1 per month fee is permitted so long as the card has not
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varying types of substantive restrictions on gift cards. Some forbid or
limit dormancy fees, other types of fees, or expiration dates. Others
require specific formats and procedures for specific types of disclosures.156
This pattern of substantive state consumer regulation contrasting
with federal regulation limited to disclosure requirements is similar
to the pattern observed in the regulation of consumer credit. And the
pattern of judicial reaction to the states attempting to challenge the
contrasting federal regulatory approaches is also similar, culminat-

been used for twenty-four months and is reloadable); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3-65c (West
2007) (inactivity fees prohibited); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-460 (West 2007) (expiration
dates prohibited); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-393 (West 2007) (must include the cards’ terms in
the packaging and conspicuously print dormancy fees or expiration dates on the card);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 481B-13 (LexisNexis 2007) (cards may not expire within first two
years of issue; service fees prohibited); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1025/10.6 (West 2008)
(cards that do not have an expiration date or any post-sale fees will not escheat); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 556.9 (West 2007) (no fees unless there is a written contract between the card
issuer and the card holder); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1423 (2008) (no expiration dates
shorter than five years and no service fees, except a one-time handling fee not to exceed
$1); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-1319 (West 2008) (no expiration dates or fees within
the first four years; restriction does not apply to cards processed through national credit
card or debit service); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 75C (West 2007) (no expiration for
the first seven years); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-108 (2007) (no expiration dates or fees;
possessor can request cash for the remaining balance if it is under $5 and the original value was more than $5); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598.0921 (West 2007) (no fees for the first
twelve months; after twelve months fees may not exceed $1 per month); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 358-A:2 (2007) (for gift cards over $100, no expiration earlier than the date the
funds escheat to the state; for those under $100, no expiration date); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:8-110 (West 2007) (no expiration dates or fees within twenty-four months; after twentyfour months, no fee greater than $2 per month; does not include prepaid bank cards); N.Y.
GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-i (McKinney 2008) (no fees prior to the thirteenth month of dormancy); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-29-02, 03 (2007) (no service or maintenance fees; no expiration date for six years); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.61 (West 2008) (no expiration date or
service fees for two years); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 797 (West 2008) (no expiration date
until five years after date of purchase and no service fees unless the remaining value is $5
or less, the fee does not exceed $1 per month, there has been no activity for twenty-four
months, the holder may reload, and the fee is printed clearly); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-12
(2007) (no expiration dates or fees); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-55 (2007) (no expiration date
within the first year; fees permitted but must be disclosed on the certificate, envelope, covering, or receipt); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-29-135 (West 2007) (issuer is exempt from turning
unused funds over to the state if the card has no expiration date or dormancy fee); TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 35.42 (Vernon 2007) (expiration dates and fees must be clearly
disclosed at the time of purchase; does not apply to financial institutions acting as financial agents for the United States or Texas); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 2702 (2007) (no expiration dates for three years); VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-531 (West 2007) (must disclose expiration
date and fees or provide a phone number or Web site where the information can be obtained); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.240.020, 19.240.040, 19.240.100 (West 2007) (prohibits fees and expiration dates, except for a fee not to exceed $1 per month when the balance
is $5 or less, the card has not been used in twenty-four months, the card is reloadable, and
the fee is disclosed on the card; doesn’t apply to gift cards issued to a financial institution
or subsidiary if useable by multiple unaffiliated sellers of goods or services).
156. See sources cited supra note 155; see also Sarah Jane Hughes et al., Developments
in the Law Concerning Stored Value and Other Prepaid Payment Products, 62 BUS. LAW.
229, 239-51 (2006) (summarizing the different ways states regulate gift cards).
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ing in the first citation of Watters as support for preemption of a
state’s substantive regulation.157
Beginning in 2004, the attorneys general of Connecticut,158 Massachusetts,159 New Hampshire,160 and New York161 sued Simon Property
Group (“Simon”) for violating state law restrictions on gift cards in
connection with gift card programs with two national banks and a
federal thrift.162 Simon is a Delaware corporation that owns and operates shopping malls in thirty-six states across the United States.163
In August 2001, Simon began selling Simon-branded Visa Giftcards
(“Giftcards”) issued through Bank of America (“BoA”).164 In 2005, Simon transferred its Giftcard program to U.S. Bank, N.A. (“USB”).165
The district courts that heard the two lawsuits brought by the attorneys general of New Hampshire and Connecticut reached different
conclusions on whether the state consumer protection laws were preempted by federal banking law, based on differences in the particular
legal entities involved in the litigation and the structure of the two
Giftcard programs.
The Connecticut case was brought against Simon166 in connection
with the BoA Giftcard program. The Attorney General alleged that
Simon violated provisions of Connecticut law prohibiting the imposition of expiration dates and dormancy or inactivity fees on gift
cards.167 The Connecticut District Court ruled that federal banking
laws and regulations permitting national banks to issue stored value
cards with expiration dates and to charge non-interest fees did not
preempt Connecticut’s laws in this case.168 The court looked carefully
at the particular contractual arrangement that Simon had with BoA,
157. See SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d. 525, 532 (1st Cir. 2007).
158. Complaint, State v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc., No. CV-04-4005355-S (Conn. Super.
Ct. Nov. 15, 2004).
159. Complaint, Commonwealth v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc., No. 04-4993 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Nov. 15, 2004).
160. Petition for Preliminary Injunction, Permanent Injunction, Restitution and Civil
Penalties, Ayotte v. Simon Property Group, Inc., No. 04-E-431 (N.H. Super. Ct. Nov. 15,
2004) [hereinafter Ayotte Petition].
161. Verified Petition, State v. Simon Prop. Group, Inc., No. 400425/05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Feb. 2, 2005).
162. The New York litigation settled, Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, supra note
156, at 247, and the Massachusetts proceeding appears to have stalled. Judith Rinearson
and K. Richard Foster, Prepaid Card Preemption Issue Under Scrutiny, 2006 J. PAYMENT
SYS. L. 9 (2006). However, the Connecticut and New Hampshire actions resulted in the litigation described in this section.
163. Ayotte Petition, supra note 160, ¶¶ 4 & 6.
164. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d 197, 200 (D.N.H. 2006).
165. Id.
166. More accurately, against SPGGC, Inc., the corporate affiliate of Simon (organized
in Virginia) that administers the operation of the Giftcard program. Complaint, supra note
158, ¶¶ 4 & 7.
167. Id. ¶ 28.
168. SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d 87, 95 (D. Conn. 2006).
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noting that BoA’s profit on the arrangement came solely from interchange fees from Visa in connection with each transaction conducted
through a Giftcard.169 Simon received all of the monthly maintenance
fees charged on the card.170 The Court reasoned that the plaintiff in
this case, Simon, was not a national bank and did not acquire the
status of a national bank merely by its close agency or business relationship with a national bank.171 Thus, Connecticut state law, as it
applied to its Giftcard program, was not preempted by the NBA.172
However, the Court emphasized that this reasoning would not apply if the plaintiff had been a national bank (in this case BoA), explaining:
the [Connecticut Gift Card Law (“CGCL”)] is a consumer protection law that regulates the sale of gift cards. The CGCL does not
purport to regulate the conduct of national banks; if it did, it might
be preempted by the NBA. If the BOA was the plaintiff in this
case, a different analysis might be required, but the BOA is not a
plaintiff. As a result, the protections of the NBA simply do not apply to [Simon], and therefore the CGCL, as applied against [Simon], is not preempted by the NBA.173

In contrast to the Connecticut case, in the New Hampshire Giftcard case, Simon’s national bank partner, USB, was a party to the
litigation.174 The New Hampshire law also prohibited the imposition
of expiration dates and dormancy or inactivity fees on gift cards.175
The New Hampshire District Court, however, distinguished the program at issue in this case from the program at issue in Connecticut,
describing as “a critical factual difference” the fact that the issuing
banks, rather than Simon, impose the various fees and establish the
expiration dates on the Giftcards.176 In addition, the Court noted
some other differences in the programs, including the fact that under
the New Hampshire program Simon’s involvement was strictly limited to sales and marketing functions, and Simon was compensated
169. Id. at 94.
170. Id.; see also Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 200.
171. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 94.
172. Id. at 95.
173. Id.
174. The Attorney General brought an enforcement action only against Simon, but U.S.
Bank was permitted to intervene as a plaintiff in the declaratory judgment action brought
by Simon. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 199. MetaBank, a federally-chartered thrift that issued gift cards sold over the Internet, was another institutional partner of Simon. The
courts deciding these cases resolved the preemption questions for the thrift in the same
manner as they had for the national bank, but under the slightly different statutory
scheme applicable to federal thrifts. Id. at 206-07; SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525,
534-36 (1st Cir. 2007). For a discussion of the relevant differences between bank and thrift
regulation, see Schiltz, supra note 12, at 604-10.
175. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 201.
176. Id. at 205-06.
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through a sales-based commission.177 Furthermore, Simon lacked the
“authority to alter the terms of the Giftcards, the associated fee
schedule, the substantive terms of the disclosures provided to the
purchaser, or the terms and conditions of the contractual relationship that arises between the consumer and the issuing bank.”178
In light of these differences in the programs, the New Hampshire
Court concluded that
the relationship between the issuing bank and the Giftcard consumer is substantial, the terms of which are established by the issuing bank. Simon’s involvement in the marketing and sale of
those Giftcards on behalf of the issuing banks does not alter or
even attenuate that relationship. . . . Consequently, the terms of
the relationship between the Giftcard consumer and . . . U.S. Bank
. . . (including the fee schedule and provisions regarding expiration
dates) are governed by federal banking law. State law, to the extent it purports to regulate the terms or essential aspects of that
relationship, is preempted.179

The issue of extending national bank preemption privileges to
third parties partnering with national banks exposed by the conflicting opinions of the New Hampshire and Connecticut district courts
has significant ramifications for other types of bank partnerships
with nonbanks, such as cobranded credit cards.180 For purposes of our
inquiry, however, the most interesting aspect of both opinions is the
point on which they both agree. Both accepted the argument that the
relevant state consumer protection laws were preempted by national
banking law with respect to the national banks involved, and both
supported their conclusions by reference to the OCC’s general articulation of its broad conflict preemption position: that state laws that
obstruct in any way a bank’s ability to exercise powers granted under
federal law are preempted.181 Indeed, the New Hampshire Court
made it a point to quote the following passage from the Connecticut

177. Id. at 206.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 206-07 (citation omitted).
180. See, e.g., Hughes, Middlebrook & Peterson, supra note 156, at 249 (speculating
about differences between cobranded credit card programs and retailer gift card programs);
Schiltz, supra note 12, at 575-82 (describing and speculating about the validity of expansion of scope of federal preemption of state consumer credit regulation to nonbank third
parties).
181. SPGGC, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d 87, 93 (D. Conn. 2006) (“[S]tate laws
that obstruct, impair, or condition a bank’s ability to fully exercise its powers authorized
under federal law do not apply to national banks.” (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4009(b) (2004));
Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (“State laws that stand as an obstacle to the ability of national banks to exercise uniformly their Federally authorized powers through electronic
means or facilities, are not applicable to national banks.” (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 7.5002 (c)
(2006)).
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court’s opinion in support of this conclusion, despite the conflicting
results of the two rulings:
Because the OCC explicitly authorizes national banks to charge
[their] customers fees, any state law that impairs a national bank
from exercising its federally authorized power to charge fees could
arguably be preempted by the NBA. The rationale underlying that
conclusion is that Congress has clearly expressed its intent for national banks to be regulated by federal authority. Complying with
both laws could cause an irreconcilable conflict, because the OCC
has ruled that, when it explicitly authorizes a national bank to exercise a power, a state may not infringe that authorization.182

The judicial endorsement of these general articulations of the
OCC’s broad conflict preemption standards is particularly noteworthy because there is no specific federal law either authorizing or regulating national bank issuance of gift cards. This is not a situation
in which the OCC can rely on Chevron deference being applied to its
interpretation of arguably ambiguous language in a federal law, as it
did in expanding the scope of the Exportation Doctrine.183 National
bank authority to issue gift cards is set forth in OCC regulations authorizing national banks to offer “electronic stored value systems.”184
Implicit in the authority to engage in this activity, according to both
courts, was the “incidental” power to establish the terms and conditions of such cards, including the imposition of charges and fees.185
Indeed, the New Hampshire court noted the absence of federal
regulation of national banks’ gift card authority: “If there are to be
any restrictions on fees associated with the Giftcards, or limitations
imposed on expiration dates, they must come either from Congress or
the federal agencies empowered by Congress to oversee national
banks . . . .”186 Against this background, it is perhaps easier to understand the reaction of the commentators187 to the OCC’s Gift Card
Guidelines—released shortly after the two district court opinions
were issued.188 The OCC provided some specific federal regulation of
182. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (alteration in original) (quoting Blumenthal, 408 F.
Supp. 2d at 93-94).
183. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
184. 12 C.F.R. § 7.5002(a)(3) (2007).
185. Blumenthal, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 93 (noting that “[a] national bank may charge its
customers non-interest charges and fees” (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2001)); Ayotte, 443 F.
Supp. 2d at 204.
186. Ayotte, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 207.
187. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
188. Between the time that the Connecticut court issued its opinion and the time the
New Hampshire court issued its opinion, the federal regulator of thrifts, the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS), issued an opinion declaring that OTS regulation preempts state
gift card regulation with respect to federal thrifts. Letter from John E. Bowan, Chief Counsel,
Office
of
Thrift
Supervision
(June
9,
2006),
available
at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/5/56218.pdf. A few months later, the OTS issued additional
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gift cards issued by national banks, even if that regulation was limited to general disclosure guidelines. This more specific regulatory
scheme bolstered the judicial inclination to defer to the OCC’s general articulation of its broad conflict preemption powers evidenced by
the two existing opinions.
Indeed, when the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court’s decision in the New Hampshire case a few years later in
SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, both the Gift Card Guidelines and the Watters decision figured prominently in its analysis.189 In a de novo review of the district court’s preemption determination,190 the First
Circuit set out a two-step analysis. First, does a national bank have
the power to issue stored-value gift cards with expiration dates and
administrative fees and to market them through third parties?191 If
so, does New Hampshire law limit a national bank’s ability to exercise that power?192 The court found that there was “little dispute”
over a national bank’s power to issued stored value cards with expiration dates and administrative fees.193 It based its decision on an
OCC determination that the issuance and sale of electronic stored
value systems, like gift cards, was “incidental to the business of
banking.”194 The court cited the Gift Card Guidance’s requirement
that expiration dates and administrative fees in connection with such
cards be disclosed as support for the fact that such features were authorized.195 The power to engage third party agents to market and
sell gift cards was found in explicit language from the NBA permitting a national bank to “use ‘duly authorized officers or agents’ to exercise its incidental powers.”196
Next, the court considered whether New Hampshire’s law “frustrates the exercise” of the national bank’s power to issue gift cards
with expiration dates and administrative fees and to use third parguidance on gift card programs by federal thrifts, similar to the OCC’s Gift Card Guide.
Memorandum from Scott M. Polakoff, Deputy Director, Office of Thrift Supervision to
Chief Executive Officers (Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/2/25254.pdf.
189. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals also upheld the lower court’s decision in the
Connecticut case, while at the same time citing Watters in reaffirming that the Connecticut
law would be preempted if the plaintiff were either a national bank or the operating subsidiary of a national bank. SPGGC, LLL V. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 189-91 (2d
Cir. 2007).
190. SPGGC, LLC v. Ayotte, 488 F.3d 525, 530 (1st Cir. 2007).
191. Id. at 531-32.
192. Id. at 532.
193. Id. at 531.
194. Id. at 531 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.5002(a)(3) (2006); OFFICE OF THE CURRENCY, OCC
BULLETIN 98-31, GUIDANCE ON ELECTRONIC FINANCIAL SERVICES & CONSUMER
COMPLIANCE 8 (1998).
195. Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 531. The court also noted that the OCC’s amicus brief suggested that expiration dates might be required as a matter of sound banking practice. Id.
at 531-32.
196. Id. at 532 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (2000)).
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ties to market and sell them.197 The court rejected as “too formalistic”
the argument that New Hampshire’s law does not conflict with any
banking law because it regulates only Simon, a nonbank.198 Citing
Watters, the court held that the relevant focus should not be on the
legal entity that New Hampshire is trying to regulate, but rather on
the activity that is being regulated—and that activity is a national
bank selling gift cards with features authorized for national banks
through a third party agent.199 Stressing that it is the bank, rather
than Simon, that regulates the terms of the gift cards, the court concluded that the activity being regulated is the bank’s activity rather
than Simon’s marketing activity:
Even if the [New Hampshire law] does not directly prohibit USB
from engaging in such activity, it does so indirectly by prohibiting
Simon from acting as USB’s agent. It would be contrary to the language and intent of the National Bank Act to allow states to avoid
preemption of their statutes simply by enacting laws that prohibited non-bank firms from providing national banks with the resources to carry out their banking activities.200

The court also rejected the argument that, since the federal law
does not require gift cards to have expiration dates or administrative
fees, there is no direct conflict between New Hampshire law and federal law. The court did not cite Watters, but rather relied on the
Watters standard for preemption: “Because the New Hampshire [law]
‘significantly interferes’ with USB’s statutory power, it is preempted
by the National Bank Act.”201
Ayotte vividly illustrates the dramatic reach of Watters and the effect of its reversal of the two basic historical preemption principles
that have guided preemption decisions in banking until now. First,
the opinion did not mention that consumer protection issues are presumptively a matter of state, rather than federal, law. Second, the
opinion applied the reversed presumption of whether state or federal
law governs the activities of the national bank. Because New Hampshire’s law was found to “significantly interfere” with a national
bank’s exercise of an incidental banking power made specific only
through OCC action, it was deemed to be preempted.202 States have,
in fact, lost their power to impose standards of consumer protection
on banking services—not just lending products, but all banking services—that differ significantly from standards (or lack of standards)

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Id.
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imposed on national banks at the federal level.203 For national banks,
at least, the efficient exercise of all of its powers on consistent, nationwide terms trumps individual conceptions by any state government of desirable levels of protection for its consumers.
III. ASSESSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE REVERSAL OF THE
HISTORICAL PREEMPTION PRESUMPTIONS.
The logic of the OCC’s broad conflict preemption position is compelling. Congress clearly did establish the national banking system
as a distinct alternative to the state banking system, and Congress
has given the OCC fairly comprehensive authority to administer this
national banking system. Although some particular statutes do defer
to state laws to provide content to the federal laws applicable to
banks,204 for the most part, national banks operate under a comprehensive set of federal laws and statutes. Furthermore, Congress did,
fairly recently, specifically authorize the evolution of this national
banking system into a truly nationwide banking system with the enactment of Riegle-Neal. The reality is that we do have a national
banking system for which state borders are operationally meaningless. There is a logical integrity to the argument that, since Congress
has authorized such a system and has given the OCC the authority
to administer this system, the OCC should have the power to ensure
operational uniformity within that system. Although the logical integrity of this argument does not necessarily extend to operating subsidiaries, Watters has effectively ended debate on whether the stateissued corporate charters of operating subsidiaries exclude them
from this congressionally-established national banking system. Thus,
absent congressional action, the Watters decision signifies the complete preemption of state consumer protection laws for national
banks and their subsidiaries.205
203. Subsequent decisions supporting this conclusion include Rose v. Chase Bank USA,
N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1036-38 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Watters in holding that claims that disclosures on convenience checks issued to credit card holders violated California credit card
disclosure requirements were preempted by the National Bank Act); Martinez v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C-06-03327 RMW, slip op. at 4-6 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2007) (citing
Watters in holding that a claim challenging servicing charges by a home mortgage lending
subsidiary of a national bank under California’s state unfair and deceptive practices act
was preempted by the National Bank Act); and Montgomery v. Bank of America Corp., 515
F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1113-14 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that claims challenging inadequate
disclosure of fees for nonsufficient funds and overdrafts in checking accounts under California’s unfair competition laws were preempted by the National Bank Act).
204. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000) (allowing national banks to charge interest at rates
permitted in the states in which the bank is located); 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (2000) (allowing national banks to branch within a state to the extent permitted by state laws); 12 U.S.C. §
92a(a) (2000) (stating that fiduciary powers of national banks determined by state laws).
205. This logic appears to extend to the OCC’s assertion of exclusive visitorial powers
as well. See Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C. v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding
the OCC’s Visitorial Regulation).
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Should Congress take any action to address this situation? Opponents of the OCC’s broad conflict preemption position assert two
main policy arguments206 for why the uniformity argument underlying the OCC’s position is not compelling enough to outweigh two
competing values asserted by the states attempting to impose their
own laws: providing effective protection to consumers within the
state and preserving the vitality of the dual banking system. The
weakness of the first argument and the strength of the second argument is made clear by assessing each argument against the backdrop
of the evolution of the preemption position outlined above, paying
particular attention to the interplay between the nationalization of
federal banking markets, federalization of consumer banking law,
and the deregulation of consumer credit laws.
A. Consequences of Federal Preemption of State Consumer Banking
Laws for Consumer Protection
Opponents of the OCC’s broad conflict preemption position present facially compelling arguments that preempting state laws will
inevitably weaken the protections provided to consumers against
abusive banking practices.207 These arguments take two different
forms. One is the substantive argument that the content of consumer
protection laws at the state level is more robust than the content at
the federal level.208 The other is the procedural argument that the
regulatory will to enforce existing laws is stronger at the state level
than at the federal level.209 However, both arguments prove to have
weaknesses when assessed in light of the three contemporaneous developments in banking services—development of national markets
for banking services, federalization of banking regulation, and substantive deregulation.
The argument that federal consumer credit law is weaker consumer credit law assumes that federal law necessarily entails deregulation. But this is not a logical inevitability. As the historical
narrative of the federalization of consumer banking law laid out in
the preceding Section demonstrates, it is entirely plausible to conclude that the federalization was motivated as much by—if not more
than—the desire to support the nationalization of the consumer
206. These arguments supplement the more specific statutory interpretation and federal agency authority arguments rejected time and time again by the courts, most dramatically by the Supreme Court in Watters. See supra Part II.C.
207. See, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking
the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 68-72 (2005); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
OCC’s Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the
Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225, 34856 (2004).
208. See Fisher, supra note 95, at 991-93; Peterson, supra note 207, at 73.
209. See Fisher, supra note 95, at 993-94; Wilmarth, supra note 207, at 348-57.
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banking market than by the desire to deregulate the consumer banking market. Indeed, the federalization through preemption of legal
regimes historically reserved to the states is not unique to the banking market. Professors Issacharoff and Sharkey have documented a
similar pattern of increased judicial deference to preemption arguments based on support for uniform national commercial markets in
the area of product liability law. They have noted “that the U.S. Supreme Court has, in preemption . . . cases, attempted to capture the
considerable benefits that flow from national regulatory uniformity
and to protect an increasingly unified national . . . commercial market from the imposition of externalities by unfriendly state legislation.”210
Indeed, while it may be true that, in the recent history of legislative assaults on particular predatory lending practices, states have
been more aggressive than the federal government,211 that has not
always been the case. One only has to look at the table of contents of
three popular law school casebooks to note that the bulk of what is
considered “consumer protection” law today is federal, rather than
state, law.212 The federalization of consumer law may have been accompanied by an overall loosening of consumer protection law;213
however, that is not primarily because federal laws have explicitly
preempted stronger state consumer protections laws—rather, the
federal laws that were actually implemented by Congress were
passed instead of hypothetically stronger state consumer protection
laws that were proposed, but failed, at the state level.
The Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968,214 the “first modern
consumer protection statute,”215 initially comprised only the Truth in
Lending Act,216 but was subsequently supplemented by the Fair Credit Reporting Act,217 the Fair Credit Billing Act and the Equal Credit

210. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 107, at 1356; see also id. at 1360-65. In another
article, Professor Sharkey focuses on the role of federal agencies in this preemption. Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort
Reform, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 227 (2007).
211. Peterson, supra note 207, 61-68.
212. See MICHAEL M. GREENFIELD, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS xxix-xxxiv (2d ed. 1991);
JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS xv-xxvi (3d ed. 2007);
DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER LAW xi-xviii (4th ed. 2006).
213. Peterson, supra note 207, at 97.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).
215. Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-inLending Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 233, 234 (1991).
216. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2000).
217. Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970), amended by the Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1681-1681t (2000)).
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Opportunity Act,218 and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.219
Each of these federal laws sets up an enforcement mechanism that
defers enforcement to the federal agency with primary enforcement
responsibility for that type of lender and preempts inconsistent state
laws.220 This model for consumer protection law at the federal level
was enacted by Congress around the same time that the National
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was mounting one of its least
successful uniform state law efforts—the Uniform Consumer Credit
Code.221 It is true that the federal law focused on disclosure rather
than on substantive regulation of credit terms. It is also true that the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code would have imposed substantive restrictions on credit terms. However, Congress enacted the federal
law, while the Uniform Consumer Credit Code largely failed to become law, except for nonuniform variations in a handful of states.222
The failure of the states to enact a strong uniform state consumer
credit law paved the way for the federalization of consumer credit
law.
The states’ failure in 1968 to generate a stronger, coordinated defense of states as the most effective level at which to provide meaningful consumer credit protection law laid the foundation for the current environment, in which it is difficult to argue that the states
should be accorded deference in conflicts between state and federal
consumer protection laws on the basis that their laws are stronger
than federal laws. It is simply no longer the case that consumer protection is the exclusive province of state legislatures; nor is it the
case that consumers have always been better protected by state rather than federal legislatures. This reality no doubt lies behind the
comfort that courts faced with recent preemption cases have felt with
the position that “[c]onsumer protection is not reflected in the case
law as an area in which states have traditionally been permitted to
regulate national banks,”223 laying the groundwork for the reversal of
the presumption against preemption of state laws dealing with consumer protection in banking services.224
The federalization of consumer protection law in banking services
does not necessarily have to entail substantive deregulation. Allegations of predatory mortgage lending led Congress to enact the Home

218. Both of these laws were enacted as Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974). The
Fair Credit Billing Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-666j (2000), and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2000).
219. Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-692o (2000)).
220. Schiltz, supra note 12, at 535.
221. See id. at 528-33.
222. See id. at 529 n.38.
223. Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1016 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
224. Id. (citing Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 2002)).
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Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994,225 which imposed
greater disclosure and substantive limits on the terms of subprime
mortgage loans.226 Indeed, the current Congress, in reaction to the
recent turbulence in the mortgage market, is considering numerous
proposals for substantive regulation of consumer credit markets.227
Thus, the argument that the content of consumer protection laws at
the state level is necessarily more robust than consumer protection
laws at the federal level is not compelling. Congress is fully capable
of enacting more substantive consumer protection laws any time it
chooses to do so.
The procedural argument that the regulatory will to enforce existing laws is more robust at the state level than at the federal level is
subject to debate. The federal banking regulators argue that the
strict oversight to which national banks are subject renders them
significantly less prone to engaging in egregiously predatory banking
practices than nonbanks engaged in consumer banking activities.228
Indeed, the Congressional Research Services recently released a
study supporting this contention in the context of the mortgage banking crisis.229 The federal banking regulators also point to the escalating volume of enforcement actions for infractions of consumer law in
the past.230 In fact, Congress has begun to respond to the OCC’s petition for more legal authority to impose and enforce consumer protection regulations.231 And at least one federal regulator, the Federal

225. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).
226. See ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN KEEST, THE COST OF CREDIT, § 12.2.2 (3d
ed. 2005) (detailing coverage and content of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act of 1994).
227. See sources cited supra note 9.
228. Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Hearing Before the
H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 14-16 (2007) (statement of John C. Dugan,
Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter Dugan Testimony].
229. EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS: SECURITIZATION AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF MORTGAGES FOR SAFETY AND
SOUNDNESS (2007), available at http://opencrs.com/rpts/RS22722_20070917.pdf.
230. Recent Events in the Credit and Mortgage Markets: Hearing Before the H. Comm.
on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. (2007) (testimony of John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the
Currency); Dugan Testimony, supra note 228; Improving Federal Consumer Protection in
Financial Services: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 110th Cong. 16-17
(2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC) [hereinafter Bair Testimony]. But see
sources cited supra note 209 (arguing that federal regulators lack the will to strictly enforce consumer protection laws).
231. Dugan Testimony, supra note 228; see also Bair Testimony, supra note 230, at 7.
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank has stated: “We can’t undo
preemption—that is just . . . a practical fact. But what we have to do is make sure [the
regulators] are able to carry out the consumer protection function that they have preempted from the states.” Cheyenne Hopkins, Democrats Eye Bill as High Court Backs
OCC, AM. BANKER, Apr. 18, 2007, at 1. The House Financial Services Committee approved
H.R. 3526, a bill that would give the OCC and the FDIC rulemaking power under the Federal Trade Commission Act to identify and prohibit unfair or deceptive practices for the in-
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Reserve Board of Governors, has recently responded to the reports of
abusive lending practices surfacing in the wake of the collapse of the
subprime mortgage market by proposing prohibitions on particularly
abusive practices for mortgage loans232 and credit card loans.233
However, even if Congress shared the critics’ assessment of the
federal banking agencies’ will to enforce consumer protection laws,
Congress could act to remedy the situation. Indeed, there is a historical precedent for such an action by Congress. In legislation passed by
Congress in 1991 in the wake of the savings and loan crisis of the
1980s, Congress effectively legislated agency “will to enforce.” The ultimate cost of the savings and loan crisis was exacerbated by regulatory agencies’ reluctance to close down thrifts that were technically
insolvent, largely due to political pressure to avoid the embarrassment of admitting their failures of oversight.234 In response, Congress
enacted a specific, mandatory scheme of enforcement actions that
federal regulators must take when capital levels of financial institutions fall below certain levels.235 If Congress were skeptical of the will
of the federal agencies to enforce particular substantive federal consumer protection it might enact, it certainly has the power to draft
laws bolstering the regulatory “will” to enforce such schemes.
In conclusion, the federal preemption of state consumer protection
law in banking services is not inevitably deregulatory. The federalization of consumer banking law was arguably spurred more directly
by a desire to facilitate the nationalization of markets for consumer
banking services than by a conscious desire to deregulate, though the
national banks benefitting from this deregulation no doubt appreciated both effects. Although the current paradigm for federal regulation of financial services is primarily one of disclosure rather than
substantive regulation, that paradigm could change.
Congress could, if it chose to, impose substantive regulation of
consumer banking services offered by all national banks and could
enact measures ensuring robust enforcement of those regulations.
Indeed, the current crisis in the mortgage banking markets and per-

stitutions under their jurisdiction. R. Christian Bruce, House Financial Services Panel
Clears Bill Giving FDIC, OCC Power to Write UDAP Rules, 89 BANK. REP. 437 (2007).
232. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226).
233. Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,904 (May 19, 2008) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 535); Truth in Savings, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,739 (May 19, 2008) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 230); Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,866 (May 19, 2008) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
234. MCCOY, supra note 128, at § 15.02. For a concise history of the savings and loan
crisis, see Jonathan R. Macey, Commercial Banking and Democracy: The Illusive Quest for
Deregulation, 23 YALE J. REG. 1, 11-17 (2006).
235. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (2000)).
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ception of unfairness in credit card terms might just provide Congress the impetus to do so. However, congressional reaction to particular financial crises once they begin to affect commercial securities
markets is unlikely to afford consumers well-considered, effective
schemes of protection in the long run. Moreover, the congressional
inclination to regulate or deregulate industry groups is likely to be as
strongly influenced by political considerations as by rational considerations of what level of regulation strikes the optimal balance between regulation or deregulation.236 A potential counterbalance to
this political pressure can arguably be identified in the more competitive mechanism of the dual banking system, which might more
effectively ensure, over the long run, an appropriate balance of regulation and deregulation in the banking services area.
B. Consequences of Federal Preemption of State Consumer Banking
Laws for the Dual Banking System
On a practical level, there is no doubt that the power to preempt
inconsistent state laws provides a significant advantage to the national bank charter. If similar power is not extended to state banks,
the value of the state bank charter is clearly eroded. A significantly
less attractive state banking charter poses a threat to the continued
vitality of the dual banking system.237 Indeed, the dissenting justices
in Watters specifically identify as the reason for their extensive dissent, “[t]he significant impact of the Court’s decision on the federalstate balance and the dual banking system.”238
However, preemption of state consumer banking laws is not the
only reason for the decline of the value in the state bank charter. Far
more significant has been the gradual regulatory homogenization of

236. Stacy Kaper, Suddenly, Banks Seem to Like Data Bill Impasse, AM. BANKER, Feb.
27, 2007, at 1 (noting apparent reversal in support of financial services lobbyists on a uniform federal data security standard that would preempt inconsistent state laws, based on
concerns that Democratic control of Congress could “potentially produc[e] a bill with onerous elements”); Eric Lipton & Gardiner Harris, In Turnaround, Industries Seek U.S. Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at 11 (noting the general surge in industry-initiated requests for federal regulation in areas such as food and drug safety and product safety and
speculating that a prime motivation is concern of growing Democratic Party control of federal government).
237. Cheyenne Hopkins, Taylor, Going, Repeat Dual System Fears, AM. BANKER, Mar.
9, 2007, at 1 (interview with Diana Taylor, outgoing superintendent of the New York State
Banking Department, discussing charter migration from state to national system in New
York as a result of preemption powers); see also Wilmarth, supra note 207, at 278-87 (documenting the decline of the state banking system and analogizing it to the decline of the
state thrift system based on aggressive preemption of state laws).
238. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 127 S. Ct. 1559 1573 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority dismisses concerns about the effect of the decision on the dual banking
system in a curt footnote that seems to reduce its significance to branching laws. Id. at
1569 n.7 (majority opinion).
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all bank charters over the past few decades.239 Because of the increasing amounts of federal regulation to which state banks are subjected
and the growing lack of any meaningful difference between the powers of state banks as opposed to national banks, there are fewer and
fewer substantive distinctions between the two charters. As Professor Scott noted over thirty years ago (before the large-scale homogenization of bank powers), “[t]he very core of the dual banking system is the simultaneous existence of different regulatory options that
are not alike in terms of statutory provisions, regulatory implementation and administrative policy.”240 The weaker the strength of that
core principle, the weaker the resulting system. Extending even
broader preemption powers to facilitate more comprehensively uniform interstate operations for national banks but not for state banks
constitutes another significant blow to the continued vitality of an already seriously weakened dual banking system.241
Is there any reason that Congress should be concerned with this
particular blow—struck as it has been in the context of preemption of
state consumer laws—when it has not been troubled by the more
general homogenization of bank regulation and bank powers in the
preceding decades? Rather than responding to this particular threat
to the dual banking system, should Congress simply allow the system
to continue on its path toward a “natural death” by attrition from the
state banking system?242 A careful look at the arguments presented
generally for the preservation of the dual banking system reveals a
recent shift in the tenor of these arguments. This shift can be tied to
the different contexts in which the arguments are being made—the
context of restrictions on bank powers imposed by state consumer
protection laws, rather than the earlier context of increasing bank
powers. The shift in focus arguably reveals an argument for preserving the dual banking system that is likely to have greater resonance
with Congress than arguments made in the past.
The dual banking system is in one sense, as Professor Miller has
noted, “highly anomalous.”243 He points out:

239. An excellent, if somewhat dated, account of this homogenization is found in Henry
N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 677, 693-707 (1988). This account is updated in Robert C. Eager & C.F.
Muckenfuss, III, Federal Preemption and the Challenge to Maintain Balance in the Dual
Banking System, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 21, 36-69 (2004); see also Hal S. Scott, What Is the
Proper
Role
of
the
States
in
Financial
Regulation?,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=922771 (forthcoming).
240. Scott, supra note 4, at 41.
241. Eager & Muckenfuss, supra note 239, at 22-23.
242. Scott, supra note 239, at 28.
243. Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Regulation: The Future of the Dual Banking System,
53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 12 (1987).
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Virtually all private business enterprises, other than depository
institutions, are chartered at the state level. Federal chartering is
generally reserved for enterprises that are partially or wholly devoted to serving a governmental interest. Yet in banking we see a
very different pattern, one of federal chartering of institutions that
are both privately owned and devoted to the pursuit of profit for
the owners.244

Adding to the anomaly of even having a federal system of chartering
for private institutions, we also have the anomaly of preserving the
arguably redundant parallel state system of chartering.
In another sense, though, the dual banking system is simply a
specific manifestation of the fundamentally federalist sensibilities
that underlie our nation. At the most basic level, our federalist system recognizes the value of state governments as a locus of authority
that constrains the centralized power of the federal government.
There are two arguments for why state governments are typically
considered to operate to provide such constraints. The first argument
is based on the advantages of competition—states can offer alternatives that, if proven superior, can serve to reform the federal model.
Pursuant to this argument, states are often characterized as “laboratories of democracy,” where smaller-scale social experiments can be
tested and incubated. If successful, the innovations bred at the state
level can be adopted to reform the entire nation, either through federal action or through uniform state adoption.245 The second argument is based on the principle of subsidiarity.246 In its most general
terms, “[s]ubsidiarity expresses a preference for governance at the
most local level consistent with achieving government’s stated purposes.”247 This principle underlies the federalist structures of governance in place in the European Union as well as in the United
States.248 It is the aspect of American federalism that holds that state
governments, as decentralized units of governing that are closer to
the people being governed, are considered to be more responsive and

244. Id. at 12-13.
245. This argument “is captured in Justice Brandeis’s famous invocation of the states
as the laboratories of democracy in which ‘a single courageous State’ may blaze new paths
by trying ‘novel social and economic experiments.’ ” Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 107,
at 1354-55 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
246. Good descriptions of the roots of the principle of subsidiarity in the teachings of
the Catholic Church and its application in other contexts can be found in Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103, 10826 (2001), and Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International
Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 38, 40-68 (2003).
247. George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European
Community and the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 339 (1994).
248. Id. at 344-403.
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accountable to their constituents, and thus governments in which
“democratic ideals are more fully realized.”249
These same basic categories of arguments are applied in the banking area to justify maintaining the dual banking system. The generalized American mistrust of centralized power that motivates preserving some decentralized locus of power is typically expressed in
the banking context as apprehension about the concentration of financial power in the hands of any one bank or even any one banking system.250
The most commonly articulated defense for maintaining the dual
banking system as a mechanism for resisting total centralization is
the competitive argument.251 While there is significant debate over
how well competition among the two regulatory schemes, as currently constituted, in fact operates,252 commentators from all perspectives invariably agree that genuine regulatory competition in theory
ought to produce the optimum scheme of banking regulation over
time.253 The state banking system is often characterized as the locus
of “laboratories of reform” in the banking area, leading to innovation

249. Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 107, at 1355. Subsidiarity has been described
as “an aspect of the original theory of American federalism which held that state governments will be more responsive than the national government to the public will [and] better
informed about local circumstances.” James L. Huffman, The Impact of Regulation on
Small and Emerging Businesses, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 307, 316-17 (2000).
250. Tamar Frankel, The Dual State-Federal Regulation of Financial Institutions—A
Policy Proposal, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 53, 54-55 (1987). Professor Scott argues that the dual
banking system, with its dynamic competition between two regulatory systems, “prevents
the formation of a single industry cartel policed through the rules and powers of a single
government agency.” Scott, supra note 4, at 35.
251. Frankel, supra note 250, at 56; Scott, supra note 239, at 27-28; Scott, supra note
4, at 12-13; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133,
1155-59 (1990).
252. Compare Butler & Macey, supra note 239, at 693-707 (arguing that the current
system is not competitive), with Wilmarth, supra note 251, at 1250-55 (arguing that the
current system is competitive).
253. Butler and Macey, for example, argue that “[t]he regulatory outcomes generated
by the dual banking system appear to be cooperative rather than competitive, because
Congress has divided up the regulatory turf of the relevant state and federal agencies in
the way most beneficial to the groups that the system regulates.” Butler & Macey, supra
note 239, at 679. However, they concede that real competition in banking regulatory
schemes (which they argue should be provided by the various states) is preferable to centralizing banking regulation at the national level. They argue that
[i]n an industry already dominated by special interests and entrepreneurial legislators, a monopoly provider of banking powers would have
no incentive to liberalize the restrictions on entry into the banking industry, to develop innovative ways to solve contracting problems banks
face, or to respond rationally to technological changes. Instead, increasing centralization will likely lead only to continued stagnation of banking laws.
Id. at 713; see also Miller, supra note 243, at 14-15.
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in banking services and forms of regulation.254 Examples of innovations in banking now common to national and state banks that originated as unique state powers include deposit insurance; automated
teller machines (ATM); NOW accounts; interstate bank acquisitions;
and securities, insurance, and real estate lending powers.255 While
these arguments for the dual banking system based on the states’ innovation have largely focused on providing banks with more powers,
more recently these arguments have begun to focus on restricting
bank powers through consumer protection regulations.256 Diana Taylor, who at the time was the New York Superintendent of Banks, recently testified before Congress on behalf of the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors that
[t]he traditional dynamic of the dual banking system has been that
the states experiment with new products and services that Congress later enacts on a nationwide basis. We generally discuss this
history in terms of expanded powers, but the states have been innovators in the area of consumer protection as, well. . . . If you lose
the states as a laboratory for consumer protections and other innovations you lose a great attribute of our federalist system—the
ability to find out what does and doesn’t work.257

Notably absent from most defenses of the dual banking system,
until very recently, have been arguments based on the subsidiarity
principle used to justify other manifestations of our federalist system. These would be the arguments based on the desire to preserve a
locus of authority that is local for various related reasons, including:
1) that it is closer to the concerns of, and more directly accountable
to, the citizens258 and 2) that local governments can be more responsive “to local conditions and local tastes.”259 More recently, however,
such arguments have begun to find their way into the debate over
preemption of state consumer protection laws.
For example, the Tenth Amendment arguments ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in Watters focus not on the competitive
rationale for the dual banking system, but rather on “preserving
state sovereignty from excessive federal regulation.”260 Critics of pre254. See Frankel, supra note 250, at 56; Wilmarth, supra note 251, at 1157.
255. Wilmarth, supra note 251, at 1156-57.
256. See Peterson, supra note 207, at 67 (characterizing the spate of state laws regulating predatory real estate loans in the early 2000s as “a classic example of state governments acting as laboratories of our democracy”).
257. Preemption of State Regulation of National Banks: Hearing on Congressional Review of OCC Preemption Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, H. Comm.
on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. 5-10 (2004) (statement of Diana L. Taylor, New York Superintendent of Banking, on behalf of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors).
258. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1509 (1987).
259. See id. at 1493.
260. See Fisher, supra note 95, at 1016.
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emption have begun to stress the subsidiarity argument more generally as well. Professor Peterson argued that the OCC’s Preemption
Regulations and Visitorial Regulation
are controversial, not merely because the recent rash of fraudulent, deceptive, and unconscionable lending has had a corrosive effect on minority communities, senior citizens, and the entire lower
middle class. Rather, their controversy lies in the fact that democratically-elected state representatives all across the country responded to their constituents’ demands by adopting such legislation, and no federal statute had ever explicitly authorized the unelected beltway banking custodians to dismiss these state consumer protection laws.261

Touching on the democratic accountability aspect of the subsidiarity
argument, Peterson in another article reminded readers that, “[t]he
comptroller of the currency does not stand for election, lives in Washington, D.C., serves as a partisan appointment, and is closely tied to
one of the most powerful industries in the country.”262
Consumer protection regulation touches the heart of what is at
stake in the subsidiarity argument in support of the dual banking
system to a much greater degree than regulation of the types of services that banks can offer, the geographic reach of their operations,
or safety and soundness regulations. Consumer protection regulations, by their very nature, protect individual citizens from otherwise
unrestrained power of the corporate entities offering banking services. The consequences of the presence or absence of consumer protection regulations, whether good or bad, are more directly experienced by the citizenry than the consequences of the presence or absence of a particular bank power. The ability of that citizenry to accurately assess whether those consequences are good or bad in the
long run is not the point here; the point is that the citizenry is more
likely to be aware of, to care about, and to hold government responsible for the presence or absence of consumer protection regulations
than regulations of bank powers, geographic restrictions, or safety
and soundness regulations. Thus, it is not surprising that the subsidiarity argument for the preservation of the dual banking system is
particularly resonant in the context of the consumer protection debate.
Moreover, the types of predatory practices that are the target of
most significant consumer protection regulation in banking services

261. See Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory
Lending by Banking Agents, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 515, 516 (2007).
262. Peterson, supra note 207, at 73.
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are often practices with unique local characteristics.263 States and local municipalities will often be in a better position to accurately assess how these local variations affect the appropriate balance between regulation and deregulation to protect consumers without restricting access to banking services. In the context of predatory lending, for example:
empirical evidence suggests that the predatory lending problem in
urban areas with large minority communities is different than the
problem that exists in areas where such communities do not exist.
The predatory lending problem in urban, minority communities
results from the higher rate of subprime lending that occurs in
those areas. By contrast, the problem in Utah, for example, is
much different. Although many borrowers in Utah are being saddled with loans they cannot handle—a common practice among
predatory lenders—the fraud in that jurisdiction often includes
participation by the borrowers themselves, who assist mortgage
brokers in the inflation of incomes and other such practices in order to be approved for a home they could not otherwise afford.
Problems faced in various jurisdictions require a distinct regulatory response.264

The subsidiarity argument that local authority should not be superseded by federal authority where the local solution is preferable is
thus particularly compelling in this situation. There are many instances in which federal solutions (imposed through preemption) fail
to address local variations in practices and needs of the community.
For these reasons, it is not surprising that the subsidiarity argument
for the preservation of the dual banking system should have a resonance in the context of the recent preemption of state consumer laws
that is stronger than that experienced in prior preemption skirmishes involving bank powers or geographical expansion.
Most commentators debating the wisdom of maintaining the dual
banking system have, until recently, tended to focus exclusively on
different aspects of the competitive arguments. While coming to different conclusions about whether competition is, in fact, effectively
creating the optimal system of banking regulation,265 most seem to
concede that, politically, the dual banking system is remarkably durable. The dual banking system is characterized as “a sacred cow in
the American political tradition,”266 “an object of almost universal ve263. DELVIN M. DAVIS & ELLEN SCHLOEMER, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CRL
ISSUE PAPER NO. 10, STRONG COMPLIANCE SYSTEMS SUPPORT PROFITABLE LENDING WHILE
REDUCING PREDATORY PRACTICES 4 (2005).
264. Christopher R. Childs, Comment, So You’ve Been Preempted–What Are You Going
to Do Now?: Solutions for States Following Federal Preemption of State Predatory Lending
Statutes, 2004 BYU L. REV. 701, 720-21 (footnotes omitted).
265. See supra note 252.
266. Miller, supra note 243, at 1.
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neration,”267 and the object of “such widespread political support
among regulators and politicians” that its premises are rarely questioned.268 What this focus on the competitive argument has perhaps
obscured is that the reason for the political durability of the dual
banking system lies in the subsidiarity rationale rather than the
competitiveness rationale. Ultimately, for politicians who are regularly held accountable to their constituents in elections, the subsidiarity arguments might be more compelling than the competitive arguments. Since the subsidiarity arguments are more directly implicated in the consumer protection area, it is possible that they will obtain more purchase with Congress than the competitive arguments
raised in past debates about the preservation of the dual banking
system dealing with bank powers or other structural issues. It is also
possible that the broadscale preemption of laws governing consumer
banking services described earlier in this Article and ratified by the
Supreme Court in Watters will prompt intervention by Congress to
reassert the competitive equality between the federal and state banking systems.
IV. CHANNELING THE POWER OF PREEMPTION TO PROTECT
CONSUMERS AND PRESERVE THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
The complete preemption of state consumer protection laws in
banking services clearly constitutes a victory for those who believe
that national banks should be permitted to offer their services on
consistent terms throughout the country, regardless of where their
customers happen to reside. It also constitutes a victory for those
who favor a minimum of substantive regulation of the terms under
which such services may be offered, since the current framework of
federal regulation of banking services is largely one of regulation by
disclosure, rather than substantive restrictions. At the same time,
however, preemption constitutes a severe blow to the state banking
system, and thus to the continued vitality of the dual banking system, since state banks are operating under the significant competitive disadvantage by not having the power to offer their services on
the same consistent terms throughout the country.
Neither the current framework of federal regulation of banking
services, nor the current state of disequilibrium in the dynamic of the
dual banking system, are set in stone. As I have argued above, the
preemption initiatives on behalf of national banks were arguably motivated as much, if not more, by a recognition of the nationalization
of the markets for banking services than by the desire to deregulate.
That nationalization applies equally to state banks. Therefore, it is
267. Scott, supra note 4, at 1.
268. Butler & Macey, supra note 239, at 678.
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arguable that, in the spirit of the competitive equality dynamic of innovation historically displayed in the dual banking system,269 this
same preemption power ought to be extended to state banks, in recognition of the nationalization of the markets for banking services,
rather than out of a desire to deregulate.
In reaction to the current mortgage crisis and perceived abuses in
terms offered by credit card companies, Congress currently is evidencing some inclination to explore whether more substantive consumer credit regulation is appropriate at the federal level.270 I believe
that Congress should take the opportunity to consider more broadly
whether the current approach to consumer protection in banking
services generally presents the best mechanism for ensuring the
proper mix of regulation and deregulation, particularly in light of
Watters’ upheaval of the historic presumptions guiding this area.
A possible starting point for such a deliberation could be a recent
proposal of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The
FDIC is the primary federal regulator of most state banks as a consequence of its authority over the federal deposit insurance fund to
which all state banks must belong.271 Shortly after the promulgation
of the Preemption Regulations, the FDIC, acting on a petition from
the Financial Services Roundtable, proposed for comment a regulation codifying for state banks preemption powers analogous to those
granted national banks.272 The rule published for comment by the
FDIC would do two things. First, it would codify its more informal
positions that grant state banks interest rate exportation powers coextensive with those granted to national banks under Section 85 of
the NBA and subsequent OCC regulations.273 Second, it would interpret provisions of Riegle-Neal that give interstate branches of state
banks the power to preempt host state laws in such a way as to quite
specifically piggyback (albeit not fully) on analogous preemption
powers extended by the OCC to national banks branching across
state lines.274 This part of the proposal provides:
A host state law does not apply to an activity conducted at a
branch in the host State of an out-of-State, State bank to the same
extent that a Federal court or the Office of the Comptroller of the
269. Competitive equality is the dynamic that has operated historically to maintain the
vitality of the dual banking system, pursuant to which regulatory innovations giving one of
the two systems a competitive advantage are typically eventually extended to the other
system. See Schiltz, supra note 12, at 565. But see Scott, supra note 4, at 41-42 (criticizing
the notion of competitive equality).
270. See sources cited supra note 9.
271. See infra note 281 and accompanying text.
272. Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,019 (Oct. 14,
2005) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 331 & 362).
273. Id. at 60,030.
274. Id. at 60,031.
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Currency has determined in writing that the particular host State
law does not apply to an activity conducted at a branch in the host
State of an out-of-State, national bank.275

The proposal defines activities conducted at a branch quite generously to include any “activity of, by, through, in, from, or substantially involving, a branch.”276
The FDIC’s proposal was open for public comment from October
through December 2005.277 It generated a flurry of comments but has
not been acted on, either to withdraw it or to move forward on it,
since it was promulgated.278 Although the lack of activity may reflect
the diversion of the FDIC’s attention to other higher-profile issues
(such as the mortgage crisis and Wal-Mart’s application for federal
deposit insurance for a Utah industrial loan corporation279), it is likely that it also reflects the fact that the proposal was intended to provoke discussion about the growing imbalance in the preemption powers of national banks as opposed to state banks, particularly in light
of the OCC Preemption Regulation.
It is not likely that the FDIC believes it has the statutory authority to assert the broad preemption power that this proposal would
grant to state banks without some congressional action. In contrast
to the OCC’s preemption rule, the FDIC’s rule, if promulgated, has
no chance of withstanding judicial challenge for many reasons. First,
the FDIC’s backup supervisory role as the insurer of state-chartered
banks is in no way analogous to the OCC’s role as the charterer and
supervisor of national banks. State banks are chartered and primarily supervised by their individual state’s banking supervisor.280 When
a state bank applies for federal deposit insurance (as required by
most states), the FDIC acquires some authority as federal supervisor
of that bank, but that authority is essentially a backup, rather than
primary, supervisory authority over that bank.281 In contrast to the
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 60,019.
278. See Joe Adler, State-Bank Preemption: 2nd Look at a Long Shot, AM. BANKER,
May 1, 2007, at 1.
279. Wal-Mart’s application to enter into the federally-insured depository institution
market through a Utah-chartered industrial loan corporation in July 2005 generated
reams of newspaper coverage, numerous regulatory and Congressional hearings, and undoubtedly absorbed significant amounts of the FDIC’s institutional resources until WalMart withdrew the application in March 2007. Press Release, FDIC, Statement of FDIC
Chairman, Sheila C. Bair on the Decision of Wal-Mart to Withdraw Bank Application
(Mar. 16, 2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2007/pr07023.html. For
a description of the legal, political, and policy issues raised by this application, see Arthur
E. Wilmarth, Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 39 CONN. L.
REV. 1539 (2007).
280. MCCOY, supra note 128, § 3.02[1].
281. As primary federal supervisor, the FDIC typically trades off annual examinations
of state banks with the state chartering authority on an annual basis. Id. §12.04[1][a]. If a
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OCC, Congress has never charged the FDIC with the authority for
creating a uniform nationwide banking system in which state banks
can operate efficiently.
This distinction between the roles of these two regulators is reflected in the complete lack of anything close to the case law history
of Chevron deference that the courts have extended to the OCC’s interpretations of the NBA. Indeed, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a First Circuit decision upholding the FDIC’s authority to
adopt a definition of “interest” as expansive as the OCC’s definition
upheld in Smiley,282 even though that authority was arguably based
on the FDIC’s authority to interpret the definition of the term “interest” in the federal statute giving state banks the authority to export
interest rates in the same manner as national banks.283
Furthermore, the FDIC’s attempt to expand the preemption powers of state banks does not have the same constitutional authority as
the OCC’s efforts. The OCC is effecting preemption of state laws by
federal laws, under the operation of the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.284 Although the content of the federal law creating the
preemption is sometimes provided by the law of the state where the
national bank is located, federal law is preempting state law. In contrast, under the FDIC’s proposal, state banking laws of one state
would be preempting state consumer laws of another state. There is
no authority under the Constitution for sister-state preemption. Of
course, if Congress were to enact a federal law that gave state banks
broader preemption rights as a matter of federal law, the Supremacy
Clause arguments would be available to support the constitutionality
of that preemption, even if the content of the preempting law might
be furnished by state law.285 In other words, Congress has the power
to do what the FDIC is attempting to do by regulation.
If Congress does, for the reasons outlined above, want to maintain
a vital dual banking system, it is usually presented as having two
basic choices—to take some preemption power away from the national banks or to give the same preemption power to the state

state-chartered bank chooses to become a member of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank becomes the primary federal backup regulator of that bank rather than
the FDIC. Id. However, even in that case, the FDIC retains some regulatory authority over
that bank in its capacity as insurer of the bank. For example, the FDIC retains the authority to determine whether proposed activities of that bank, even if permitted under the
bank’s state law, are prohibited as posing too great a risk to the federal deposit insurance
fund. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831e(a)-(b) (2000).
282. Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st. Cir. 1992); see also
Schiltz, supra note 12, at 565-68 (providing a more detailed discussion of this issue).
283. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a).
284. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
285. Indeed, this is precisely what Congress did in extending Exportation Authority to
state banks. See infra note 292 and accompanying text.
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banks. The first option will certainly be opposed by the national
banks, and the second option is opposed equally as forcefully by
about half of the state attorneys general who have commented on the
FDIC’s proposal (including the attorneys general of California, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, and
Vermont)286 as well as the Banking Commissioners of Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and
Vermont.287 The opponents articulate sound reasons for their opposition, including concerns about the “race to the regulatory bottom” by
states seeking charters,288 the inability of states to protect their citizens from unscrupulous out-of-state banks,289 and the unmanageable
confusion confronting consumers faced with financial service providers exporting potentially fifty different sets of laws into any one state.290
However, I think that these opponents of state bank preemption
powers need to consider the consequence of not extending the same
sort of preemption power to state banks—the inability of their statechartered institutions to compete on a nationwide basis in the provision of banking services. The potentially devastating consequences of
this to the continued vitality of the state banking system need to be
taken seriously. I think it is time to consider the possibility of channeling the power of preemption for state as well as federal banks, in
recognition of the reality that geographic limitations are no longer
meaningful in the provision of banking services. However, if this
channeling of the power of preemption to state banks is to also preserve the vitality of the competitive dynamic of the dual banking system, it will be crucial to recognize that preemption need not necessarily entail deregulation.
The preemption of state interest rate regulation by the expansion
of the Exportation Doctrine described above291 was extended to state
banks by congressional fiat.292 This simple extension of preemption
286. Letter from Eliot Spitzer, Attorney Gen. of NY, to Robert E. Feldman, Executive
Sec’y, FDIC (May 16, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/
05c6petition.pdf [hereinafter NY AG Letter]; Letter from Bill Lockyer, Attorney Gen. of
Cal., to Robert E. Feldman, Executive Sec’y, FDIC (May 18, 2005), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/05c13petition.html.
287. Letter from John P. Burke et al., Banking Regulators, to Robert E. Feldman, Executive Sec’y, FDIC (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/
2005/05c9petition.pdf [hereinafter Bank Regulators Letter].
288. See NY AG Letter, supra note 286, at 7; Bank Regulators Letter, supra note 287,
at 2.
289. See NY AG Letter, supra note 286, at 7-8; Bank Regulators Letter, supra note
287, at 2.
290. See NY AG Letter, supra note 286, at 8-9.
291. See supra Part II.A.
292. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000); Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, § 521, Pub. L. No. 96-221; see also Schiltz, supra note 12, at 565-67.
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power to state banks without any limitations did, indeed, contribute
to the well-documented “race to the bottom” in state regulation of interest rates,293 as states competed to attract banks desiring to export
the lack of regulation. This pattern is not, however, inevitable.
A possible variation on this pattern could be effected if Congress
were to consciously decouple preemption from deregulation by conditioning broad exportation and preemption powers by national banks
on some basic threshold of consumer protection requirements and by
extending analogous exportation and preemption powers to state
banks chartered in jurisdictions meeting or exceeding those same
consumer protection thresholds. The basic threshold of federal consumer protection laws could remain focused on disclosure or could include some substantive restrictions. More important for purposes of
this proposal is that Congress preserve the right of state banks to offer an alternative to the federal level of consumer protection in banking services.
To do this, Congress would have to partially reverse Watters. Congress would have to reassert its mandate in Riegle-Neal that consumer protection laws be recognized as being of particular interest to
state governments.294 It would do so not by subjecting national banks
to state consumer banking laws, but by preserving the possibility
that state banks subject to a different, state-determined set of consumer protection laws can compete on a nationwide basis with national banks. Preserving this regulatory power for the states, while
at the same time extending the preemption power to state banks
whose states chose to offer a distinct approach to consumer banking
services, would present a possible bulwark against the complete homogenization of the federal and state banking systems. A national
banking system could compete nationwide with a state banking system, and both could offer different levels of consumer protection.
Whether this possibility would, indeed, revitalize the dual banking system would depend largely on whether the states in fact resisted the race to the bottom by consciously competing with national
banks by enacting and aggressively promoting the advantages of
banking services coming from consumer-friendly regulatory regimes.
As geographic location continues its slide into irrelevance in the
choice of providers of banking services, the niche of customers willing
to choose banking service providers based on a state “seal,” as it
were, of consumer protection could be cultivated.
Recent studies of behavioral economists and others are beginning
to suggest, at the very least, strong consumer reactions to particular

293. Schiltz, supra note 12, at 568, 619-20.
294. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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types of credit terms,295 sales pitches,296 and perceptions of the safety
of particular products.297 These studies indicate that consumers are
sensitive to credit terms in addition to rates; features seen as enhancing the safety of a product might be more important to some
consumers than the rate alone. For example, in one recent study of
low-income credit card users, they were found to be willing to accept
high interest rates in order to preserve access to credit, but would
prefer credit cards with terms such as low but inviolable credit limits
or options to convert credit card debt into installment debt.298 These
studies suggest that a market in regulated consumer services might
realistically compete with a market in unregulated or minimallyregulated consumer banking services. If the only market that exists
is a uniform, national, unregulated market, consumers will never
have the opportunity to demonstrate such a preference. With some
congressional support in giving state banks the power to compete nationally, and with the conscious rejection of preemption as always entailing deregulation, the states could continue serving as the laboratories of reform and the responsive units of democratic accountability
that underlie the vision of a robust dual banking system.

295. See Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1395-1408 (2004);
Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card Use and Preference Among LowIncome
Consumers,
TEX.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2008),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=968330.
296. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 725 (2005).
297. Bar-Gill, supra note 295, at 1395-1408; Littwin, supra note 295, at 20-25.
298. Littwin, supra note 295, at 13-25.

946

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:893

